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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the early 1990s, statewide merit-based aid has been prevalent across the country. As merit-based 
aid subsidizes full tuition and required fees at public colleges for students with solid academic records, it has 
gained popularity to the point where the number of students who meet its eligibility exceeds the amount of 
available funds. As a result, several states with large merit-based aid programs considered raising their 
eligibility standards or reducing the award amount. At this point, it is timely to examine whether merit-based 
aid achieves its stated goals.   
In this dissertation, I examine whether or not merit-based aid promotes college affordability, student 
persistence, and degree attainment in three different studies. Despite positive effects of merit-based aid on 
college enrollment and graduation (e.g., Dynarski, 2004; Scott-Clayton, 2011), there is evidence that suggests 
that merit-based aid might have some unintended consequences on students due to the very fact that merit-based 
aid provides a generous amount of grant aid to students with solid academic records. To date, only a few studies 
(e.g., Long, 2004) have directly tested these unintended consequences of merit-based aid. In order to fill the gap 
in the literature, I explore whether the availability of merit-based aid leads to these potential negative 
consequences on students as follows.     
Above all, as the adoption of merit-based aid makes the direct costs of college education almost free for 
its recipients, it makes going to in-state public four-year colleges more attractive than in the past. When a state’s 
merit-based aid program has a relatively lenient academic requirement, it might have attracted many students 
who are academically underprepared for college education to public four-year colleges (Binder, Ganderton, & 
Hutchens, 2002). If these students find themselves not ready for college education, they might choose to drop 
out anyway even with the generous support from their state. If this were the case, merit-based aid might 
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unintentionally incentivize students to make an unwise college choice and states to spend their resources 
inefficiently.  
Even if these underprepared students decide to remain in college, it is very likely that they lose their 
merit-based aid after a couple of years. In most states with merit-based aid, merit-based aid recipients must 
renew their scholarship eligibility by maintaining their cumulative GPA above a certain point. Each year, a 
large number of students fail to renew their scholarship eligibility due to the GPA requirement. Given the 
positive relationship between family income and academic performance, these students could be more likely to 
come from disadvantaged backgrounds and be more responsive to college prices than their counterparts from 
advantaged backgrounds. Combined with their lack of academic preparation, losing scholarships may make it 
more difficult for these students to remain in college and earn their degrees. However, to date, little is known 
about what happens to these students after they lose their scholarships.  
Lastly, the fact that students with solid academic records are guaranteed to get a majority of their tuition 
and fees subsidized (through merit-based aid) may incentivize colleges to raise their tuition or reduce the 
amount of institutional aid, which mitigates the intended effect of state merit-based aid. Under the long and 
constant decreases in state support as well as in the number of college-going students, colleges have been 
actively involved in revenue-generating activities such as seeking more external grants or recruiting students 
who can pay full tuition (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Given the context, the adoption of new financial aid 
policy that guarantees subsidizing a majority of tuition and fees for a large number of students could be a great 
opportunity for colleges to increase their revenue by raising their student charges or reducing the amount of 
institutional aid provided. If this were the case, creating a new merit-based aid program or increasing the 
funding for the program might not achieve its stated goal of making college education more affordable for 
students with solid academic records.       
As a whole, this dissertation asks whether merit-based aid policy, which has been popular among the 
public and known to promote educational attainment of state residents, has some unintended consequences on 
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students. Although separately explored, all three scenarios described above are built upon the suspicion that the 
seemingly positive quality of merit-based aid (e.g., generous funding, academic criteria, etc.) can actually have 
the opposite effects on students. It is not uncommon to observe that a policy has some unexpected results when 
it is implemented. This dissertation asks if any of the unexpected results occurred and attempts to provide policy 
implications. In addition, as a whole, this dissertation explores if merit-based aid policy can be an answer to 
address some of the most pressing issues in American higher education: rising college prices and stagnant 
college graduation rates.       
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In the second chapter of this dissertation, I examine 
whether public and private four-year colleges whose states adopted a merit-based aid policy significantly 
change their tuition and fees, the amount of institutional aid per student, and room and board charges more than 
colleges whose states did not adopt a merit-based aid policy. To answer the question, I analyze data from the 
Integrated Postsecondary Educational Data System using the difference-in-differences method. Results from 
this study will answer one of the important questions regarding government financial aid: Does it really make 
college more affordable, or does it generally serve as a new source of college revenue? 
While the second chapter investigates the effect of merit-based aid at the institutional level, the third and 
fourth chapters explore its effect on student persistence and degree attainment using the example of Tennessee. 
In 2004, Tennessee implemented its statewide merit-based aid, Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarships 
(TELS). TELS shares some common features with other states’ merit-based aid programs as its eligibility is 
solely determined by students’ test scores and high school grades. However, it is unique in that it has 
supplementary components for either highest-achieving students or low-income students. This leads to two 
different possibilities. On one hand, the income supplements as well as its relatively lower ACT requirement in 
the first year of implementation are expected to help students from disadvantaged backgrounds attend college, 
who would have not been eligible for merit-based aid in other states (Heller & Marin, 2004). On the other hand, 
it is also possible that some students who benefitted from the lower eligibility standards might not fare well in 
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college and discontinue their study at some point. Given the two contrary possibilities, I evaluate the effect of 
receiving merit-based aid on student success using administrative data from Tennessee.  
In the third chapter, using the regression discontinuity method, I examine whether receiving TELS in the 
freshman year affects college graduation within six years as well as the timing of graduation. In this chapter, I 
compare initial recipients to non-recipients regardless of their scholarship renewal status in terms of their 
graduation probabilities. In the fourth chapter, I examine whether a student’s scholarship status affects 
persistence and graduation in each semester up to six years. In Tennessee, more than one-half of initial 
scholarship recipients lose their aid in college. If students lose their scholarship, will it affect their persistence, 
graduation, and time taken to obtain their degree? I answer these questions using event history analysis and 
regression discontinuity models.  
The last chapter provides concluding remarks for all three studies. I first summarize the results from 
each study. Then, I explain what I have learned about merit-based aid from this dissertation and suggest what 
needs to be done in terms of policy as well as future research. At the end of this dissertation, I introduce my 
future research agenda.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
Does Merit-Based Aid Improve College Affordability? 
Testing the Bennett Hypothesis in the Era of Merit-Based Aid 
 
Abstract 
This study tests the Bennett hypothesis by examining whether or not four-year colleges changed listed 
tuition and fees, the amount of institutional grants per student, and room and board charges after their states 
implemented statewide merit-based aid programs. Because many statewide merit-based aid programs cover full 
tuition and fees for students enrolled in their state colleges, I hypothesize that colleges whose states 
implemented merit-based aid programs would raise student charges or reduce institutional aid for more revenue. 
Using the difference-in-differences method, I analyze data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS) from 1987 to 2009. My results show that colleges significantly changed their prices, but did 
not always increase the net price that students had to pay. Public colleges in many states with merit-based aid 
reduced published tuition and fees and increased the amount of institutional grants per student. These results 
suggest that the implementation of merit-based aid programs could make college education more affordable for 
those who received the aid, and may not harm non-recipients.   
 
Key words: merit-based aid, the Bennett hypothesis, tuition, institutional aid   
 
Introduction 
College affordability has become an important concern across the country. According to a national 
survey in 2009, more than half of American adults surveyed believed that academically qualified students did 
not have enough opportunities for college education in spite of its importance for their future success 
	   7	  
(Immerwahr et al., 2010). Rising college costs and student debt levels also suggest that college education is out 
of reach even for many students from middle-income families. To mitigate the financial burden of students and 
families, governments and colleges spend a huge amount of money on financial aid. In 2010, federal and state 
governments invested approximately 141.3 billion dollars, and colleges spent 29.7 billion dollars on 
undergraduate financial aid (College Board, 2011).  
Among many scholarship programs, statewide merit-based aid is a new type of financial aid that covers 
tuition and fees for in-state college students exclusively based on their academic merit. Due to its simple rules 
and broad coverage, statewide merit-based aid has been widely available across the country and draws lots of 
attention from researchers. To date, researchers show that merit-based aid largely increases freshman 
enrollments, particularly in four-year public colleges (Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2002). 
Given these results, it seems clear that merit-based aid is successful at boosting freshman enrollments. 
However, little is known about its potential, and possibly negative, impact on students and colleges. One of the 
potential consequences is its impact on college tuition as suggested in the Bennett hypothesis. According to the 
Bennett hypothesis, increases in federal aid make it easier for colleges to raise their tuition because the aid will 
help students pay tuition (Bennett, 1987). The hypothesis seems plausible in the case of merit aid given that 
merit aid programs cover a substantial portion of listed tuition and fees for a majority of students in state public 
colleges. If state governments paid tuition, why would students and colleges be concerned much about tuition 
increases? 
My study examines how colleges responded to the creation of statewide merit-based aid and the impact 
of these responses on college affordability. Although many studies show the positive impact of financial aid on 
student demand, little is known about its impact on the supply side (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; Heller, 1997). 
However, understanding institutional responses to financial aid is important because colleges can modify the 
impact of financial aid by changing tuition, room and board charges, and the amount of institutional grants 
(Long, 2004). This study investigates a relatively unexplored area, institutional responses to financial aid, and 
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tests the possibility that a financial aid policy that provides institutions with different incentives may not be as 
effective as originally intended. The results can inform state policy makers who are interested in whether or not 
their merit-based aid policy has improved college affordability, especially given the recent tuition hikes and 
economic recessions (Baum & Ma, 2011; Quizon, 2011).  
 
Background 
Since the early 1990s, statewide merit-based aid has been popular across the country. After Arkansas started its 
Academic Challenge Scholarship in 1991, more than a dozen states implemented statewide merit-based aid 
programs.1 Following previous studies (e.g., Dynarski, 2002; Zhang & Ness, 2010), I define statewide merit-
based aid programs as those whose eligibility is solely determined by students’ academic achievement and those 
that target a wide population of resident students rather than a few elite students. Table 1 summarizes each of 
these programs’ inception year, eligibility requirements and award amounts when each program was first 
implemented. In some states, eligibility standards and award amounts have changed over time. Because my 
study examines changes in student charges right before and after merit-based aid was implemented, I focus on 
the academic requirements and award amounts applied during the first year of implementation of each merit-
based aid program in this study.  
According to Table 1, merit-based aid programs have some common features although their academic 
requirements and award amounts differ. First, most programs set the academic standard around a 3.0 high 
school GPA. This standard makes it possible for these programs to benefit a large number of resident students 
considering that approximately “40% of high school seniors in 1999 met this standard” across the country 
(Dynarski, 2002, p. 64).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 According to the NASSGAP (2011), all except seven states provided non-need-based grants in the academic year of 2010 to 2011. 
However, some of these non-need-based grants consider students’ financial needs as well as academic performances.    
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Table 1. Statewide Merit-Based Scholarship Programs 
State 
(Start Year) Initial Criteria Award amounts per year 
Alaska 
(1999/ 
2011) 
1. UA Scholars Program  
(UA System only; top 10% of graduating class) 
 
2. Alaska Performance Scholarship (three-tiered) 
 1) 3.5 GPA & 25 ACT or 1680 SAT 
 2) 3.0 GPA & 23 ACT or 1560 SAT 
 3) 2.5 GPA & 21 ACT or 1450 SAT 
$2,750 
 
 
 
1) $4,755 
2) $3,566 
3) $2,378 
Arkansas 
(1991) 
Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship 
 - 2.5 GPA in HS core & 19 ACT 
 
Public & Private:  
1st year: $2,500 
2nd year: $2,750 
3rd year: $3,000 
4th year: $3,500 
Florida 
(1997) 
Florida Bright Futures Scholarship (two-tiered) 
      1. Florida Academic Scholar 
H.S. (3.5 GPA & 1270 SAT or 28 ACT) 
 
2. Florida Medallion Scholar 
H.S. (3.0 GPA & 970 SAT or 20 ACT) 
 
Public 
1. 100% tuition & fees 
2. 75% tuition & fees 
 
Private 
The average public tuition & fees 
Georgia 
(1993) 
Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally 
  - 3.0 GPA 
Public: full tuition & fees 
Private: $3,000 
Kentucky 
(1999) 
Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship 
 - 2.5 GPA 
Public: $125-$2,500 
Private: equivalent 
(Award varies based on a high school 
GPA from 9th to 12th grade. 
Additionally, students can earn bonus 
amount based on SAT/ACT scores 
and AP/IB exams) 
Louisiana 
(1998) 
Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (three-tiered) 
1. Honors Award 	  - 3.0 GPA & 27 ACT  
2. Performance Award 
 - 3.0 GPA & 23 ACT 
3. Opportunity Award 
 - 2.5 GPA & ACT score above the state’s average  
 
Public: 
1. Tuition & fees + $800 
2. Tuition & fees + $400 
3. Tuition & fees 
 
Private: The average public tuition & 
fees 
Maryland 
(2002-2005) 
Maryland HOPE Scholarship 
 - 3.0 GPA in HS Core 
Public & Private: $3,000 
(subject to availability of fund) 
Massachusetts 
(2005) 
The John and Abigail Adams Scholarship  
 - Score “advanced” or “proficient” AND top 25% of 
graduating class in their district in MCAS math and English 
 
Public only: tuition only (up to six 
semesters) 
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Table 1. Statewide Merit-Based Scholarship Programs (continued) 
 
State 
(Start Year) Criteria Award 
Michigan 
(2000-2008) 
Michigan Merit Award & Promise Scholarship 
- Level2 on all four components of MEAP test or, 
- Level2 on two components of MEAP test and 75th 
percentile of SAT/ACT 
In-state public & private: $2,500 
Out-of-state public & private: $1,000 
 
Not renewable (one-time award) 
Mississippi 
(1996) 
1. Mississippi Resident Tuition Assistance Grant (MTAG)  
 - 2.5 GPA & 15 ACT 
 
2. Mississippi Eminent Scholars Grant (MESG) 
 - 3.5 GPA & 29 ACT 
 
Public & Private:  
Freshmen/Sophomore: $500 
Junior/Senior: $1,000 
 
 
 
Up to $2,500 per year (no more than 
tuition and fees) 
Missouri 
(1987) 
Bright Flight Scholarship 
- Top 3-5% of all MO students taking either ACT or SAT 
Depending on annual funds  
(Up to $3,000 for public & private) 
Nevada 
(2000) 
Millennium Scholarship 
 - 3.0 GPA & pass the state’s exit exam 
 
Public only 
Up to $2,500  
New Mexico 
(1997) 
Lottery Success Scholarship 
 - No H.S. criteria 
 - 2.5 GPA at the1st semester in college 
 
Public only: tuition & fees 
South Carolina 
(1998) 
LIFE Scholarship 
 - 3.0 GPA & 1100 SAT/24ACT Public & Private: $2,000 
Tennessee 
(2004) 
Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarship (four-tiered) 
 1. GAMS 
  - 3.75 GPA & 28 ACT 
 2. HOPE Base 
 - 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT 
 3. ASPIRE 
 - 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT & AGI<36k  
 4. ACCESS 
 - 2.75 GPA & 18 ACT & AGI<36k  
 
Public & Private: 
 
1. $4,000 
2. $3,000 
3. $4,000 
4. $2,000 
 
West Virginia 
(2002) 
PROMISE 
 - 3.0 GPA & 1000 SAT/21 ACT 
 
Public: tuition & fees 
Private: average tuition & fees 
Source: Dynarski (2002); Dynarksi (2005); Hu, Trengove, and Zhang (2012); Orsuwan & Heck (2009); Zhang & Ness (2010); States’ 
web sites 
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Second, most programs cover more than half of tuition and fees at their state’s public four-year colleges, 
especially when each of these programs was adopted. Table 2 provides the average tuition and fees at public 
and private four-year institutions when each state started its merit-based aid program. Several states (e.g., 
Georgia and Florida) subsidized 100% of tuition and fees for students enrolled in public four-year colleges, 
while other states such as New Mexico and Nevada provided a fixed amount of money that was sufficient to 
pay tuition and fees at public four-year colleges.  
Lastly, most of these programs, except ones in Massachusetts, Nevada, and New Mexico, provide the 
equivalent amount of money to students enrolled in private colleges in their states. The amount was not 
sufficient, but it would still have been helpful for these students to pay their tuition. Considering the lenient 
academic standards and generous award amounts, merit-based aid might be an easier target from which colleges 
can appropriate revenue compared to other financial aid programs.  
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Table 2. Merit-Based Aid Award Amounts and the Average Tuition Levels 
State Award Amount Average Tuition & Fees (in Current Dollars) 
Public Four-Year Private Four-Year 
AR2 $2,500 $1,805 $5,721 
FL Pub: 75% to 100% of tuition and fees Priv: Weighted average t&f of Public 4-year colleges $1,911 $11,525 
GA Pub: Tuition and fees Priv: $1,500 $1,886 $9,040 
KY $500-$2,500 (Depending H.S GPA & ACT score) $2,723 $9,614 
LA Pub: Tuition and fees Priv: Weighted average t&f of Public 4-year colleges $2,390 $14,003 
MA Tuition only (up to 8 semesters) $7,290 $27,335 
MI $1,250 (for the first 2 years) $4,615 $11,155 
MS 
MTAG: 
Freshmen & Sophomore: $500  
Junior & Senior: $1,000 
MESG: $2,500 
$2,497 $7,226 
NM Tuition only (from the 2
nd semester) 
(public only) $2,073 $8,943 
NV $2,500 $2,344 $11,465 
SC Pub: $2,000 $3,414 $10,660 
TN $4,000 $4,039 $15,074 
WV Pub: Tuition & Fee Priv: Equivalent Amount $2,898 $12,441 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Due to the data availability, the average tuition and fees at public and private four-year colleges in Arkansas are for the academic 
year of 1993 to 1994. Considering that the tuition and fees are non-decreasing over time, I assume that tuition and fees in 1991 would 
have been even lower than the amount shown in the table.    
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Conceptual Framework 
My study is grounded on the Bennett hypothesis and Bowen’s revenue theory of costs. The Bennett 
hypothesis suggests that colleges increase listed tuition and fees to capture additional revenue resulting from an 
increase in financial aid. This hypothesis rests on the revenue theory of costs which argues that colleges try to 
increase revenue as long as it does not harm their reputations (Bowen, 1980). According to Bowen, there is a 
spiral effect among college finances (including tuition and institutional aid), educational quality, and reputation. 
Colleges with large external subsidies from governments and philanthropies can afford charging less for 
students and spending more on education. This investment in turn attracts high-performing students and 
scholars to their institutions, which enhances the colleges’ reputations. Colleges with high-achieving students 
and scholars then attract more external funding from governments and private sectors, and the spiral goes on. 
The fact that most colleges are non-profit also allows them to spend as much revenue as they have (Martin, 
2011).  
To summarize, colleges seek for more revenue to invest in their students, scholars, and facilities to 
enhance their reputation. Because most merit-based aid programs cover a substantial portion of tuition and fees 
for a majority of their state resident students, I hypothesize that colleges attempt to capture this new source of 
revenue by increasing their listed tuition and fees, reducing their own spending on institutional grants, or 
increasing room and board charges.  
 
Literature Review 
Overall, researchers find positive effects of merit-based aid on students’ academic preparation, college 
enrollment, and graduation. First of all, merit-based aid appears to motivate high school students to work hard 
to meet the academic requirements. After the HOPE scholarship started in Georgia, the average SAT scores of 
high school seniors and college freshmen significantly increased (Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar, 2006; Henry 
and Rubenstein, 2002). In Tennessee, the number of students who scored a 19 or above on ACT, which was the 
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cut-off score to receive the state’s merit-based aid at the time, increased after the implementation of the merit-
based aid (Pallais, 2009).  
Second, the availability of merit-based aid increases college enrollments, especially in four-year colleges 
(Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2002). After analyzing the data for seven Southern states that 
adopted merit-based aid before 2000, Dynarski (2002) shows that merit-based aid in all seven states but South 
Carolina has significant and positive effects on college enrollments. Zhang and Ness (2010) argue that merit-
based aid keeps the best and brightest students in their states because the enrollment increases after the 
implementation of merit-based aid programs are the largest in research universities that are typically more 
selective than any other types of institutions.  
Lastly, merit-based aid also promotes degree attainment. At the state level, Dynarski (2005) finds that 
the share of adults with college degrees (at least an associate’s degree) significantly increased after Arkansas 
and Georgia introduced their merit-based aid programs. In Georgia and Florida, Zhang (2011) also reports the 
increased number of bachelor’s degree-holders after the implementation of their merit-based aid programs. Both 
studies show that the positive effects are larger for women than men. At the student level, Henry, Rubenstein, & 
Bugler (2004) show that HOPE recipients in Georgia are more likely to persist and graduate within four years 
compared to students who lost or never received the HOPE scholarship. Looking at West Virginia, Scott-
Clayton (2011) also provides evidence that the incentive embedded in the state’s PROMISE scholarship 
encourages students to take sufficient credits to graduate within four years.  
Despite these positive effects, there are concerns about the unintended consequences of merit-based aid. 
First, Heller and Marin (2002; 2004) suggest that the fact that merit-based aid is assigned solely based on 
academic achievement could limit college access for racial-minority or low-income students who, on average, 
have lower test scores. In fact, Dynarski (2004) shows that the enrollment effect can be heterogeneous across 
racial groups by finding a clear and negative effect of merit-based aid on African-American and Hispanic 
students in Georgia. However, Singell Jr., Waddell, and Curs (2004) find that the number and proportion of 
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low-income students have not decreased in both two-year and four-year colleges since the HOPE scholarship 
started. In addition, there is some evidence that merit-based aid increases enrollment and degree attainment of 
both white and non-white students in a few states (Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2002, 
Dynarski, 2005). Considering these results, overall, merit-based aid appears to have positive effects on students 
despite its heterogeneous effects across different groups. Another concern regarding merit-based aid is its 
impact on institutions. Because merit-based aid provides a majority of students enrolled in public colleges with 
grants of high monetary values, colleges might try to capture rents3 by raising their tuition, as suggested in the 
Bennett hypothesis.   
To date, only a few studies have examined whether the Bennett hypothesis holds true in the context of 
merit-based aid. Long (2004) finds that private four-year colleges in Georgia directly increased tuition and fees, 
while public four-year colleges decreased tuition and increased room and board charges. These price increases 
were the most pronounced in colleges with many HOPE recipients. In contrast, since the inception of Florida’s 
Bright Futures Scholarship, Calcagno and Alfonso (2007) find that community colleges in Florida increased the 
amount of institutional grants without changing tuition and fees. The authors explain that these community 
colleges seemed to cover the unmet needs (the difference between listed tuition and fees and grants from all 
sources) of their students because many community college students were eligible for the Florida Medallion 
Scholars, which provided only 75% of tuition and fees.4  
The Bennett hypothesis was also tested with other federal and state financial aid programs. When the 
revenue from the Pell Grants or federally subsidized loans increased, there were significant tuition raises in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Rent-seeking activities occur when a government imposes restrictions on economic activities (Krueger, 1974). Agents attempt to 
influence social or political environments in a way that limits entry of their competitors into the market and guarantees their profits to 
some extent. Lobbying, occupational licensing, and education subsidies are the example of rent-seeking activities (Pasour, 1987). 
However prevalent, rent-seeking activities have been regarded as socially problematic because they redistribute wealth to the agents’ 
favor rather than creating new wealth. In the context of my study, colleges might pursue increasing their revenue from their state’s 
merit-based aid program by raising their prices. If so, it not only attenuates the intended effect of state efforts to make college 
education affordable but also makes it hard for students to pay their tuition bill.  4At the time of the study, there were four types of merit-based aid in Florida depending on a student’s academic performance. The 
first two programs for the highest-achieving students covered all tuition and fees, while the other two programs provided only 75% of 
tuition and fees. Considering the relatively lower academic achievement of community college students, many students in community 
colleges were expected to receive one of the latter two aid programs.  
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public four-year colleges (McPherson & Shapiro, 1991), state flagship universities (Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2004) 
and both public and private four-year colleges (Singell & Stone, 2007). These results suggest that colleges 
change their tuition in response to the federal policy changes. On the other hand, Lan and Winters (2011) do not 
find significant tuition changes in colleges that enrolled many D.C. residents after the District of Columbia 
College Access program started.5  
Recent studies emphasize the importance of looking at institutional grants in addition to listed tuition 
and fees when investigating colleges’ responses to government financial aid policies. When focusing on Pell 
Grants recipients, Turner (2012a) finds that students who received more Pell Grants were awarded fewer 
amounts of institutional grants. In addition, Turner (2012b) shows that colleges reduced the amount of 
institutional grants approximately dollar-for-dollar for students who received federal tax credits. Because 
students had to wait until April to receive their tax benefits, they took out loans to pay tuition before their 
academic year began. These results show that the intended benefit of federal aid programs, to ease the financial 
burden of students and families by subsidizing tuition and fees, was offset by decreased college grants. Lastly, 
Curs and Dar (2010) also show that colleges responded differently to state financial aid depending on their 
governance structures. Public colleges in states with coordinating governing boards and private colleges, both of 
which enjoy more institutional autonomy, raised their net price in response to increased state aid. In contrast, 
public colleges in states with consolidating boards, which are granted less autonomy, reduced listed tuition and 
increased institutional grants.  
Lastly, there are many factors other than the adoption of state merit-based aid policy that can affect 
demand for higher education, which could indirectly but eventually be related to college prices. According to 
the economics of higher education literature (e.g., Cohn & Geske, 1990), there are several factors that shift the 
demand for higher education. For example, increases in the size of young adult population as well as state 
unemployment rates generally increase the demand for higher education (e.g., Lehr & Newton, 1978; Stafford, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The D.C. Access program covered the difference between in-state and out-of-state tuition for D.C. residents enrolled in out-of-state 
colleges.  
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Lundstedt, & Lynn, 1984). The relationship between unemployment rates and demand for higher education can 
also be explained by the human capital theory as the indirect costs of college education (opportunity costs) 
decrease as unemployment rates go up.   
In addition, according to Long (2004), a state’s wealth, culture, and traditional approach regarding 
higher education can be related to supply and prices of college education in the state. To take into account these 
factors, she adds the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree, annual per capita income, and 
annual unemployment rate in her statistical model.   
  Lastly, it is possible that colleges change the amount of institutional aid if their states change the 
amount of state need- and merit-based aid. One of the widespread concerns about state merit-based aid is that 
states might have moved their resources from need-based aid to merit-based aid. Although previous studies 
show that state merit-based aid does not crowd out state need-based aid (Doyle, 2010; Longanecker, 2002), 
colleges still might consider the amount of state need-based grants when they decide how much institutional aid 
they spend on their students.   
To summarize, colleges and universities appear to respond to external financial aid policies. Their 
response is the greatest in colleges where a large number of students benefit from the policy, or in colleges with 
more market power and institutional autonomy over tuition setting. Colleges also change the amount of 
institutional grants as well as listed tuition and fees in response to external aid changes. Based on my review of 
the literature, my study investigates three research questions. First, after merit-based aid policies were 
implemented, did four-year colleges in merit-based-aid states increase tuition and fees more than colleges in 
states without merit-based aid? Second, after the policies were implemented, did four-year colleges in merit-
based-aid states reduce the dollar-value of institutional grants awarded per student67 more than colleges in states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Throughout my study, “the dollar-value of institutional grants per student” means the average amount of money that a student 
receives from his/her institution in the form of grants.  
7 When looking at the amount of institutional aid, it can be important to differentiate institutional merit-based aid from institutional 
need-based aid. Colleges might have switched some money from their own merit-based aid to need-based aid in order to complement 
financial unmet needs of their students who are not eligible for state merit-based aid. Unfortunately, IPEDS do not provide separate 
data for institutional merit- and need-based aid.   
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without merit-based aid? Third, after the policies were implemented, did four-year colleges in merit-based-aid 
states increase room and board charges more than colleges in states without merit-based aid?  
By looking at all the three price measures, this research provides a more complete picture of whether 
and/or how four-year colleges responded to their state’s merit-based aid policy. It is important to examine all 
three prices because colleges sometimes use an indirect way of raising their prices instead of directly increasing 
their tuition, as Long (2004) demonstrates. In addition, this research examines all thirteen states that have 
adopted merit-based aid. This allows me to explore whether colleges’ responses are different depending on each 
state’s merit-based aid design, which has rarely been considered in previous studies.  
 
Data & Sample 
I use data from the Integrated Postsecondary Educational Systems (IPEDS) collected by the National 
Center for Education Statistics from 1987 to 2009. IPEDS is the most appropriate existing data set to study 
postsecondary education institutions because it provides college characteristics, enrollments, and finance 
information on every postsecondary institution that applied for or participated in any federal financial aid 
program authorized by Title IV.  
I limit my sample to public four-year colleges and nonprofit private four-year colleges across the U.S. I 
first excluded for-profit colleges because they may have different pricing policies given their explicit goal of 
making profits. Moreover, a majority of students enrolled in for-profit colleges were non-traditional adult 
students who were not eligible for state merit aid in most states.8 I also excluded two-year colleges because 
introducing merit-based aid can have different effects on these institutions compared to four-year colleges, as 
illustrated in Calcagno and Alfonso (2007). 9 Lastly, I dropped specialized (e.g., seminary or art school) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Most merit aid programs were limited to students who immediately went to college after high school graduation. 	  	  
9 There are some colleges who were originally classified as two-year institutions, but changed into four-year institutions in later years. 
Most of these colleges are branch campuses or community colleges that offer bachelor’s degrees in some areas. I treated these colleges 
as two-year colleges and excluded them from my study.        
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tribal colleges because many of these colleges are very small, pursue a specific educational goal, and have 
different revenue structure compared to four-year colleges.10  
After excluding these colleges, my sample has 449 public four-year colleges and 840 private four-year 
colleges. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of my sample in the academic year of 1990-1991. At this 
time, there was no statewide merit-based aid program available.11 The top panel in Table 3 shows the 
descriptive statistics for colleges in all 50 states, while the bottom panel provides the descriptive statistics only 
for colleges in Southern states.12 
Across the country, colleges in merit-based-aid states charged slightly lower tuition and room and board 
charges, provided less amounts of institutional grants, and received less amounts of external resources than 
colleges in non-merit-based-aid states. This pattern is consistent when I focus on Southern states, except that 
public colleges in merit-based-aid states charged slightly higher tuition and fees than public colleges in non-
merit-based-aid states. This pre-policy trend poses a question if the argument, which many states adopted 
statewide merit-based aid programs because their colleges charged higher tuition in the first place, were true.     
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In order to exclude these special purpose colleges, I dropped colleges that are classified as associate’s institutions, specialized 
institutions, or tribal institutions according to the Carnegie Classification 2000/2005.  
11 Missouri’s Bright Flight Scholarship was available during the year. However, I do not count the program as a state merit-based aid 
program because it was limited to the top 3-5% students who took the ACT or SAT.  
12 I compare the descriptive statistics of the treatment group to other Southern states because most states in the treatment group are 
located in the South.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Samples in 1990-1991 (in current dollars) 
 
All 50 States 
 
Public 
(N=449) 
Private 
(N=840) 
Merit Non-Merit Merit Non-Merit 
Tuition & Fees 1,713.3  (460.4) 
1,816.1 
(683.4) 
7,681.4 
(3,555.8) 
8,632.3 
(2,989.0) 
Institutional Grant 
Aid 
2,606,379.8 
(5,184,482.8) 
3,409,412.1 
(6,062,356.3) 
4,152,109.5 
(9,987,164.4) 
4,364,755.4 
(7,866,662.7) 
Room & Board 
Charges 
2,813.0 
 (654.6) 
3,129.4 
(809.5) 
3,648.9 
(1,203.9) 
3,719.3 
(915.5) 
State Appropriation 51,293,205.0  (71,667,659.5) 
64,142,718.7 
(97,174,295.8) 
1,737,566.7 
 (3,155,878.4) 
1,639,749.7 
(3,793,545.5) 
Private gifts, 
contracts, 
endowments, & 
investments  
7,116,868.8 
(17,706,073.0) 
8,717,136.8 
(20,883,783.7) 
8,032,662.3 
(32,652,977.1) 
7,253,309.6 
(24,931,330.2) 
Southern States Only 
 
Public 
(N=187) 
Private 
(N=258) 
Merit Non-Merit Merit Non-Merit 
Tuition & Fees 1,595.8 (334.8) 
1,566.3 
(697.2) 
6,312.4 
(2,783.6) 
6,990.9 
(2,498.8) 
Institutional Grant 
Aid 
2,093,384.6 
(2,662,123.6) 
2,787,509.8 
(5,659,199.2) 
2,805,554.1 
(6,799,777.7) 
2,890,136.5 
(4,725,112.3) 
Room & Board 
Charges 
2,668.9 
(615.0) 
2,997.7 
(766.0) 
3,246.5 
(983.3) 
3,411.6 
(877.0) 
State Appropriation 47,769,720.8 (67,380,897.3) 
53,827,388.6 
(105,777,121.4) 
4,500,639.2 
(5,800,593.0) 
1,639,556.6 
(3,021,694.5) 
Private gifts, 
contracts, 
endowments, & 
investments  
5,651,463.6 
(14,615,697.6) 
8,361,070.6 
(22,783,298.9) 
4,365,614.1 
(10,043,727.8) 
7,797,420.9 
(24,378,874.9) 
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Methods 
To answer my research questions, I use the difference-in-differences method. The difference-in-
differences method compares the before-and-after-policy change in an outcome variable for the treatment group 
to that of the control group. For example, in my study, I compare change in tuition observed in the treatment 
group (colleges whose states implemented merit-based aid policies) to that of the control group (colleges in 
other states that have not adopted merit-based aid policies) four years before and after the introduction of merit-
based aid. I choose this eight-year window because it takes at least four years for a newly adopted merit-based 
aid program to be available for all students from freshmen to senior.  
When using the difference-in-differences method, it is important to choose appropriate control groups 
that are similar to the treatment group except the policy of interest (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). In this study, I 
employ two control groups: 1) colleges located in states that belong to the same regional compact with the 
treatment group and 2) colleges in all 50 U.S. states. The first control group is colleges located in states that 
belong to the same regional compact with the treatment group and that have not adopted merit-based aid 
programs during the time period studied (four years before and after a treatment state implemented merit-based 
aid). For example, I compare colleges in Georgia to colleges in the rest of Southern Regional Education Board 
states that never adopted merit-based aid from 1989 to 1996. Because Arkansas adopted its merit-based aid in 
1991, colleges in Arkansas are excluded from the control group for Georgia.    
In addition to states that belong to the same regional compact, I also use colleges in all U.S. states that 
never adopted merit-based aid during the time period studied as a control group.  Previous studies use Southern 
states as a control group because most merit-based aid states are located in the South, and these states are 
comparable in terms of higher education demand and economic condition (Dynarski, 2002; Long, 2004; Zhang 
& Ness, 2010). However, my study looks at thirteen states that adopted merit-based aid programs in different 
years, and I exclude these states from the control group once they adopted merit-based aid. This decision results 
in only a few states (e.g., five states) left in the control group for the treatment group that adopted merit-based 
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aid in the mid-2000s. For this reason, I employ the second control group (colleges in all U.S. states) and see if 
the estimates significantly differ. Using this second control group will complement the sample size issue 
although it may not be as comparable to the treatment group as the first control group is.  
Equation (1) is the statistical model that I use to answer my research questions. I run the model 
separately for public and private four-year colleges because these two types of colleges substantially differ in 
terms of tuition levels and the major source of revenue. I also run the model separately for each of the thirteen 
merit-based-aid states because each state has a different higher education context and merit-based aid program, 
which could lead to different effects across states. In equation (1),  is the dependent variable of institution i 
located in state s in year t. Note that  refers to listed tuition and fees for the first research question, the 
amount of institutional grants awarded per FTE student for the second research question, and room and board 
charges for the third research question. I take a natural logarithm of these dependent variables so that I can 
interpret a coefficient as a percent change as a result of a one-unit change in an independent variable. 
  
                                   (1) 
 
In the model above, merit is a dummy variable for each of the treatment states analyzed, and post is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether or not merit-based aid has been adopted in the treatment state. The 
interaction term between these two variables ( ) is the key independent variable of this study. If the 
Bennett hypothesis holds, the coefficient on the interaction term ( ) will be statistically significant and positive 
for the first and third research questions, suggesting increased tuition and fees and increased room and board 
charges, respectively. For the second research question, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
the interaction term ( )	  means that colleges reduced the amount of institutional grants per student in response to 
the creation of merit-based scholarships. I also add year ( ) and state fixed effects ( ) to capture potential 
year-specific and state-specific effects on college prices.  
€ 
yist
€ 
yist
€ 
yist = α + γ (merit) + λ(post) +δ(merit⋅ post) + φs(states) +θ t (yeart ) + Xist' β+ε ist
€ 
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€ 
δ
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€ 
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€ 
φs
	   23	  
Xist is a vector of state-level and college-level covariates that are known to affect tuition and financial 
aid. At the college level, I add a dummy variable that indicates a doctoral-granting institution. I also include 
state appropriation revenue (only for public college), revenue from private sources (such as investment return, 
endowment income, private gifts, grants, and contracts), the number of full-time and equivalent (FTE) students, 
and the number of full-time faculty members. I add these variables because selectivity and size of institutions 
are closely related to the amount of revenue from external sources (Curs & Dar, 2010; Long, 2004; Lowry, 
2001; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2004; Singell & Stone, 2007). In addition, there are several state-level time-varying 
covariates in the model: the size of young adult population (20 to 24 years old), state unemployment rates, the 
percentage of bachelor’s degree holders among the population, per capita income, and the total amount of state 
need-based grants awarded. These state-level covariates are related to a state’s higher education demand, which 
in turn affects college enrollment and tuition levels (Cheslock & Hughes, 2011; Lowry, 2001).  
When using a panel data set, serial correlation is a serious problem that significantly reduces the 
standard error of estimates and hence falsely rejects the null hypothesis (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 
2004; Wooldridge, 2005). To address this issue, I use cluster-robust standard errors which minimize the impact 
of heteroskedasticity of errors (Drukker, 2003).  
 
Results 
Tables 4 through 7 show the difference-in-differences estimates. Tables 4 and 5 show the results for 
public four-year colleges using states that belong to the same regional compact and all 50 states as a control 
group, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 present the results for private four-year colleges using states that belong to 
the same regional compact and all U.S. states, respectively. Table 8 summarizes all these results. In order to 
save space, I present only the coefficient on the interaction term between merit-based aid and post-policy 
dummy variables ( ). Full results are available upon request.  
€ 
δ
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Table 4 provides coefficients and standard errors for public colleges in each of the thirteen treatment 
states compared to public colleges in states that belong to the same regional compact. In the first column, I put 
the name of each treatment state and sample size used in the model for each state. The next three columns show 
price changes in tuition and fees, the amount of institutional grants per student, and room and board charges 
after each treatment state implemented its merit-based aid program. For example, 1,298 public four-year 
colleges in total are used to analyze price changes in response to Arkansas’ Academic Challenge Scholarship. 
After the scholarship was implemented in 1991, public colleges in Arkansas significantly increased in-state 
tuition and room and board charges by 2.1% and 10.3%, respectively. However, they did not significantly 
change the amount of institutional grants compared to public colleges in other Southern states. 
Overall, colleges in many states changed their prices13 in response to the implementation of merit-based 
aid; however, their responses differed across states and college types. Due to the heterogeneity in the estimates, 
I will discuss on a few common patterns across states, and then discuss two factors that partially explain the 
heterogeneous responses. When discussing my results, I will focus on the results that are consistent across the 
two control groups. In general, most estimates especially for public colleges are consistent regardless of control 
groups used. However, estimates tend to be more sensitive when the sample size used in the analysis is 
relatively small (e.g., estimates for room and board charges or private colleges). The abbreviation of states with 
consistent results is italicized in Table 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Throughout my study, “college prices” or “prices” mean the three outcomes of my study: listed tuition and fees, the amount of 
institutional grants per student, and room and board charges.  
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Table 4. Difference-in-Differences Results for Public Colleges (Using regional compact states) 
 
 In-State Tuition (1) 
Institutional Grant 
(2) 
Room & Board Charge 
(3) 
Arkansas 
(N=171) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.045) 
0.103*** 
(0.010) 
Florida 
(N=122) 
-0.067*** 
(0.015) 
0.214** 
(0.071) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
Georgia 
(N=178) 
-0.125*** 
(0.019) 
0.414*** 
(0.061) 
0.056*** 
(0.010) 
Kentucky 
(N=121) 
0.052* 
(0.025) 
-0.069 
(0.045) 
0.018 
(0.019) 
Louisiana 
(N=126) 
-0.048 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.080) 
-0.035* 
(0.016) 
Massachusetts 
(N=19) 
0.126*** 
(0.010) 
0.272* 
(0.130) 
0.054** 
(0.017) 
Michigan 
(N=101) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
0.359 
(0.347) 
-0.027* 
(0.013) 
Mississippi 
(N=129) 
-0.147*** 
(0.021) 
0.176** 
(0.067) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
Nevada 
(N=77) 
0.097** 
(0.032) 
-0.482* 
(0.229) 
-0.053* 
(0.027) 
New Mexico 
(N=82) 
-0.035 
(0.051) 
0.010 
(0.104) 
0.057** 
(0.025) 
South Carolina 
(N=124) 
0.052** 
(0.020) 
0.066 
(0.040) 
-0.085*** 
(0.015) 
Tennessee 
(N=91) 
-0.017 
(0.022) 
0.144 
(0.099) 
-0.113*** 
(0.019) 
West Virginia 
(N=94) 
0.008 
(0.027) 
-0.065 
(0.099) 
0.054*** 
(0.007) 
Note: Every model includes state and year fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors are used. 
Note: p-value: *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
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Table 5. Difference-in-Differences Results for Public Colleges (Using all U.S. states) 
 
 In-State Tuition (1) 
Institutional Grant 
(2) 
Room & Board Charge 
(3) 
Arkansas 
(N=422) 
0.032** 
(0.013) 
-0.076 
(0.059) 
0.086*** 
(0.009) 
Florida 
(N=372) 
-0.006 
(0.031) 
0.148** 
(0.061) 
0.016* 
(0.009) 
Georgia 
(N=431) 
-0.080*** 
(0.019) 
0.304*** 
(0.059) 
0.041*** 
(0.010) 
Kentucky 
(N=354) 
0.042** 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.071) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
Louisiana 
(N=359) 
-0.042 
(0.026) 
0.179 
(0.137) 
-0.021* 
(0.013) 
Massachusetts 
(N=317) 
0.099*** 
(0.030) 
0.189** 
(0.087) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
Michigan 
(N=339) 
-0.029* 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.175) 
-0.027*** 
(0.009) 
Mississippi 
(N=379) 
-0.144*** 
(0.015) 
0.191** 
(0.083) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Nevada 
(N=326) 
0.053 
(0.029) 
-0.588* 
(0.242) 
-0.061*** 
(0.012) 
New Mexico 
(N=368) 
-0.044** 
(0.017) 
0.114* 
(0.062) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
South Carolina 
(N=357) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
0.037 
(0.066) 
-0.087*** 
(0.009) 
Tennessee 
(N=316) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.114) 
-0.085*** 
(0.012) 
West Virginia 
(N=327) 
0.018 
(0.033) 
-0.643* 
(0.374) 
0.040*** 
(0.008) 
Note: Every model includes state and year fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors are used. 
Note: p-value: *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
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Table 6. Difference-in-Differences Results for Private Colleges (Using regional compact states) 
 
 Out-of-State Tuition (1) 
Institutional Grant 
(2) 
Room & Board Charge 
(3) 
Arkansas 
(N=237) 
0.091*** 
(0.020) 
-0.095** 
(0.037) 
0.080*** 
(0.016) 
Florida 
(N=184) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
0.330*** 
(0.029) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
Georgia 
(N=248) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.111*** 
(0.023) 
-0.058*** 
(0.011) 
Kentucky 
(N=175) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.021) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
Louisiana 
(N=166) 
-0.005 
(0.025) 
-0.128** 
(0.048) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
Massachusetts 
(N=90) 
0.023 
(0.016) 
0.045 
(0.050) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
Michigan 
(N=220) 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.153*** 
(0.037) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
Mississippi 
(N=182) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
0.081** 
(0.026) 
0.023** 
(0.008) 
Nevada 
(N=93) 
0.238*** 
(0.011) 
0.729*** 
(0.050) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
New Mexico 
(N=96) 
0.111*** 
(0.020) 
0.322*** 
(0.060) 
0.130*** 
(0.031) 
South Carolina 
(N=175) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.168*** 
(0.023) 
0.035*** 
(0.007) 
Tennessee 
(N=141) 
-0.025* 
(0.012) 
-0.051 
(0.029) 
-0.013* 
(0.006) 
West Virginia 
(N=122) 
0.048 
(0.027) 
0.236* 
(0.111) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
Note: Every model includes state and year fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors are used. 
Note: p-value: *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
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Table 7. Difference-in-Differences Results for Private Colleges (Using all U.S. 50 states) 
 
 Out-of-State Tuition (1) 
Institutional Grant 
(2) 
Room & Board Charge 
(3) 
Arkansas 
(N=796) 
0.095*** 
(0.010) 
-0.087*** 
(0.025) 
0.064*** 
(0.008) 
Florida 
(N=740) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.279*** 
(0.018) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
Georgia 
(N=808) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.064** 
(0.026) 
-0.064*** 
(0.007) 
Kentucky 
(N=711) 
0.020*** 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.012*** 
(0.005) 
Louisiana 
(N=702) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
-0.133*** 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Massachusetts 
(N=650) 
-0.026*** 
(0.009) 
-0.051* 
(0.029) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
Michigan 
(N=696) 
-0.027*** 
(0.005) 
0.097** 
(0.020) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
Mississippi 
(N=738) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.041* 
(0.024) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
Nevada 
(N=678) 
0.215*** 
(0.008) 
0.859*** 
(0.021) 
-0.018* 
(0.008) 
New Mexico 
(N=718) 
0.082*** 
(0.007) 
0.388*** 
(0.019) 
0.096*** 
(0.006) 
South Carolina 
(N=711) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.169*** 
(0.014) 
0.035*** 
(0.004) 
Tennessee 
(N=631) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.046** 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
West Virginia 
(N=658) 
0.052*** 
(0.011) 
0.242*** 
(0.031) 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
Note: Every model includes state and year fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors are used. 
Note: p-value: *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
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Table 8. Results Summary Table by Outcomes 
 
Outcome Sign Public Private Neighbors All Neighbors All 
Tuition 
+ 
5 
(AR, KY, MA, NV, 
SC) 
5 
(AR, KY, MA, NM, 
SC) 
4 
(AR, GA, NV, NM) 
9 
(AR, FL, GA, KY, 
LA, NV, NM, SC, 
WV) 
- 3 (FL, GA, MS) 
3 
(GA, MI, MS) 
2 
(MI, TN) 
2 
(MA, MI) 
Institutional Aid 
+ 4 (FL, GA, MA, MS) 
4 
(FL, GA, MA, MS) 
7 
(FL, GA, MI, MS, 
NV, NM, WV) 
7 
(FL, GA, MI, MS, 
NV, NM, WV) 
- 1 (NV) 
3 
(NV, NM, WV) 
3 
(AR, LA, SC) 
5 
(AR, LA, MA, SC, 
TN) 
Room & Board 
+ 
5 
(AR, GA, MA, NM, 
WV) 
5 
(AR, FL, GA, MA, 
WV) 
4 
(AR, MS, NM, SC) 
5 
(AR, FL, MS, NM, 
SC) 
- 
5 
(LA, MI, NV, SC, 
TN) 
6 
(LA, MI, NV, NM, 
SC, TN) 
3 
(GA, KY, TN) 
6 
(GA, KY, MA, MI, 
NV, NM) 
 
 
First of all, there are several states whose four-year colleges increased either tuition and fees or room 
and board charges, if not both. For instance, both public and private four-year colleges in Arkansas significantly 
raised both types of student charges after their state adopted merit-based aid. Public colleges in Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, and South Carolina as well as private colleges in Georgia, Nevada, and New Mexico also raised 
their tuition and fees more than their comparison groups. These results show that in many states colleges raised 
their student charges in response to the adoption of merit-based aid.  
However, the increased student charge does not necessarily mean that the net price students paid out of 
pocket has gone up. When I look at all three outcomes simultaneously, colleges in some states increased the 
amount of institutional aid per student when they raised student charges. For example, public colleges in 
Georgia and Massachusetts as well as private colleges in New Mexico and Nevada increased both the amount of 
institutional aid and tuition. If colleges provided more money for institutional aid per student, the negative 
impact of tuition increases would be mitigated to some extent. Moreover, there are many states whose colleges 
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have not significantly changed all three outcomes (e.g., Tennessee) or whose colleges only increased 
institutional aid without raising student charges (e.g., Florida). In these states, attending four-year colleges has 
not become more expensive than their comparison groups.   
 
Table 9. Results Summary Table (Common Patterns) 
 
Pattern Description Public Private 
Increased student 
charges 
Colleges increased tuition and/or room and 
board charges without raising institutional aid 
3 
(AR, KY, WV) 
3 
(AR, SC, LA) 
Increased student 
charges, Increased 
Aid 
Colleges increased institutional aid as well as 
tuition and/or room & board charges  
1 
(MA) 
3 
(MS, NV, NM) 
Increased aid Colleges increased institutional aid without changing student charges - 
2 
(FL, WV) 
Decreased student 
charges 
(Increased aid) 
Colleges decreased tuition and/or room and 
board charges (and increased aid in some 
cases) 
5 
(FL, MS, LA, MI, 
TN) 
2 
(KY, MI) 
Inconclusive results 
1) Results are sensitive depending on control 
groups, or 
2) One type of student charges (e.g., tuition) 
increased, while the other (e.g., room and 
board charges) decreased.   
4 
(GA, NV, SC, NM) 
3 
(GA, MA, TN) 
 
Considering all three outcomes within each state, Table 9 summarizes the direction of the net price 
change in each state. Except the last (fifth) category, I present the common patterns observed in the order of less 
affordable to more affordable. For example, colleges in the first category raised student charges without 
increasing student aid. This is the worst scenario observed. If students did not receive merit-based aid, they 
should pay higher prices than before, compared to their peer students in other states. Public colleges in 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia as well as private colleges in Arkansas, South Carolina, and Louisiana 
belong to this category.  In the second category, colleges also raised student aid in addition to increasing student 
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charges. Although colleges charged their students more than before, the increased aid would most likely help 
students pay for their education.  
In a state that belongs to the third or fourth category, college education appears to become more 
affordable. In the third category, colleges increased the amount of student aid without changing student charges. 
Private colleges in Florida and West Virginia fall into this third category. After the adoption of merit-based aid, 
students in these colleges have more money to pay their tuition that has not been significantly increased 
compared to colleges in other states. In the fourth category, colleges in these states decreased student charges 
relative to colleges in other states.14 In other words, after the adoption of merit-based aid, going to colleges in 
these states becomes less expensive than going to colleges in other states. Public colleges in five states and 
private colleges in two states show these results. Moreover, some of these colleges (e.g., public colleges in 
Florida and Mississippi or private colleges in Michigan) increased the amount of institutional aid per student. 
As a result, college education in these states could become more affordable than before.   
Lastly, there are some states where there is not sufficient evidence to determine the overall direction of 
the net price changes. In the fifth category, estimates in some states (e.g., public colleges in New Mexico) are 
sensitive depending on the control group choice. Or, colleges in other states show contrasting results between 
tuition and fees and room and board charges. For example, public colleges in Georgia significantly reduced 
tuition and fees and increased room and board charges. Long (2004) finds the same results and explains that 
these contrasting results suggest limited capability of public colleges in determining their own tuition. Although 
this is totally plausible, it is difficult to directly compare the percentage point changes between the two price 
measures (tuition and fees versus room and board charges). Therefore, I make a separate category for these 
states with contrasting estimates and leave them as inconclusive.  
So far, I have described a few common patterns in my results and demonstrated the heterogeneity of 
these estimates. My results are strikingly different across states and college types. In order to explain the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This does not mean that colleges literally decreased student charges. The nominal value of student charges almost always goes up, 
but the level of increases was smaller than that in other states.   
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heterogeneity, I explore whether each state’s merit-based aid design as well as higher education governance 
structures are related to colleges’ responses. As seen in Tables 1 and 2, eligibility requirements and award 
amounts are widely varied across states. These differences in merit-based aid design could provide colleges 
with different incentives. I hypothesize that colleges whose states set less rigorous requirements and provide 
generous funding are more likely to raise their student charges and reduce the amount of institutional aid per 
student. In contrast, colleges whose states set more rigorous requirements and provide fewer amount of 
institutional aid would be less likely to raise student charges and reduce institutional aid.    
In Figure 1, I locate states depending on rigorousness of academic requirements of their merit-based aid 
and generosity of the funding. The x-axis represents the rigorousness based on the minimum high school GPA 
required, while the y-axis represents the generosity in terms of the percentage of the average tuition and fees at 
in-state public four-year colleges covered by merit-based aid. If a state’s merit-based aid program is multi-tiered 
(e.g., Florida’s Bright Future Scholarships), I use the least rigorous standard and the minimum award amount. 
In Massachusetts and Michigan, scholarship eligibility has been determined by their state exam scores or 
standardized test scores rather than high school GPAs. Because students in these two states are required to be 
within the top 25% on these tests to be eligible for merit-based aid, I assume that this requirement is more 
rigorous than having a 3.0 in high school.        
According to Figure 1, states on the top left corner (e.g., Arkansas and Louisiana) covered almost 100% 
of tuition and fees in public four-year colleges, while these states set the minimum requirement around a 2.5 
GPA. Hence, I hypothesize that colleges in these two states would be more likely to take advantage of the 
system by raising student charges and/or reducing institutional aid. In contrast, states on the right bottom corner 
(e.g., Massachusetts and Michigan) limited the eligibility around the top 25% within their state and provided 
only a portion of tuition and fees. Because the number of eligible students was very limited, colleges in these 
states are expected not to raise student charges and/or reduce institutional aid. These hypotheses partially 
explain the results. Among the four states that I mentioned above, the hypotheses fit the results for Arkansas 
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and Michigan. Colleges in Arkansas (with large incentive) raised student charges without increasing 
institutional aid, while colleges in Michigan (with small incentive) decreased student charges. However, the 
hypotheses do not explain results for Louisiana and Massachusetts well. Although merit-based aid provided 100% 
tuition and fees to students with a 2.5 high school GPA, public colleges in Louisiana decreased student charges. 
In Massachusetts, public colleges raised all three price measures although their state merit-based aid covered 
tuition only, leaving a large amount of required fees unsubsidized. These results suggest that colleges do not 
always respond to the incentives embedded in merit-based aid programs.  
Moreover, private colleges significantly changed their prices in some states even though merit-based aid 
in these states were not eligible for students enrolled in private colleges. Of the thirteen states examined in this 
study, three states (Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Nevada) limit the merit-based aid eligibility to students in 
their public colleges. If private colleges in these states had responded to their state’s merit-based aid (or 
incentive generated from the aid), they would have not increased their tuition due to possible loss of students. 
However, private colleges in New Mexico and Nevada increased their tuition as well as the amount of 
institutional aid per student. These responses in private colleges also call into question whether colleges change 
their prices in response to merit-based aid.         
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Figure 1. Academic Requirements and Award Amounts of Merit-Based Aid 
 
Another factor that can explain the heterogeneous responses observed is whether individual institutions 
in a state have capability of setting their own tuition. As Long (2005) mentions, public colleges have less 
authority over their tuition than private colleges. Instead, their tuition levels are monitored or consulted by many 
stakeholders such as state legislature, state higher education agency, or system board (Bell, Carnahan, & 
L’Orange, 2011). Following Curs and Dar (2010), I hypothesize that the way public colleges respond to merit-
based aid is different depending on the level of autonomy that individual colleges have regarding their tuition 
levels. In particular, colleges with less autonomy would reduce their student charges or increase the amount of 
institutional aid per student so that their tuition policy can be aligned with their state initiative.  
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Table 10. Higher Education Governance Structure 
 
(A) Primary Authority over Tuition 
Primary Authority States 
State Legislature FL, LA 
Statewide Agency for Multiple 
Systems GA, KY, MA, NM, NV  
Governing Boards for Individual 
Systems TN 
Individual Institutions AR, MI, MS, SC, WV 
(B) Higher Education Governance Structure 
Structure States 
Consolidating Board FL, GA, MS, NV  
Regulatory Coordinating Board 
with Budget Authority AR, KY, LA, MA, NM, SC, TN, WV 
Planning Agency MI 
Source: Panel (A) Christal (1997); Rasmussen (2003); Bell, Carnahan, & L’Orange (2011), Panel (B) Doyle (2013).   
Note: Higher education governance structure implemented at the time of adoption of merit-based aid (or the closest year, if not 
available) is reported.   
 
Table 10 provides information about higher education governance structure in each state. Based on the 
survey conducted by State Higher Education Executive Officers, panel (A) shows the agency that had the 
primary authority over tuition setting within a state when its merit-based aid was adopted. The information is 
placed in the order of the level of centralization from the most centralized (e.g., state legislature) to the least 
centralized (e.g., individual institutions). Panel (B) provides the type of higher education governance structure 
in each state at the time of merit-based aid adoption. As Richardson et al., (1999) explain, decision-making 
process is more centralized in a state with a consolidating board, while individual institutions have more 
autonomy in a state with a coordinating board or a planning agency. According to both panels, state agencies (or 
external boards) appear to have more influence on public colleges in Florida, Louisiana, Georgia, Mississippi, 
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and Nevada than other states. Of the five states with a more centralized form of governance, public colleges in 
Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi decreased student charges and sometimes increased the amount of 
institutional aid per student. Public colleges in the other two states (Georgia and Nevada) show mixed results. In 
addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is an initiative to keep public college tuition low in Florida and 
Georgia because tuition increases would directly call for more funding for merit-based aid (Rasmussen, 2003). 
Although higher education governance structure does not perfectly explain the way colleges respond to merit-
based aid either, it explains why public colleges in some states might not be able to raise their net prices in 
response to their state merit-based aid.        
 
Conclusion 
My study examines whether four-year colleges changed listed tuition and fees, the amount of 
institutional grants per student, and room and board charges after the implementation of merit-based aid. To 
summarize, colleges significantly changed these prices after their states implemented merit-based aid. However, 
these price changes did not always increase the net price that students actually paid for their education. As 
opposed to the Bennett hypothesis, public colleges in some states significantly reduced tuition and fees in 
response to their state’s merit-based aid. Although private colleges in many states significantly raised tuition 
and fees, many of them also increased the amount of institutional grants per student, which may offset the 
negative effects of tuition raises. The direction and magnitude of college responses differed across states, but 
each program’s academic requirements and award amounts were not always related to the way colleges 
responded to merit-based aid. State higher education governance structure explains the way colleges responded 
to merit-based aid to some extent.   
These results can be interpreted in two ways. First, the adoption of merit-based aid does not necessarily 
make our public colleges more expensive in most states. Although colleges in a few states significantly raised 
tuition and/or room and board charges, some of them also increased the amount of institutional aid per student. 
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Moreover, public colleges in many states either decreased or did not significantly change tuition and fees. 
Considering these results, attending public college in most merit-based-aid states appears to be more affordable 
for many students eligible for merit-based aid. As listed tuition and fees have remained stable or even decreased 
in many states, receiving merit-based aid helps students pay their tuition. If these students received other 
sources of financial aid (e.g., Pell Grants) in addition to their merit-based aid, the adoption of merit-based aid 
would significantly reduce their unmet needs. Even for students who were not eligible for the aid programs, the 
introduction of merit-based aid did not significantly raise the cost of attending public four-year colleges in most 
states. Despite these non-negative results at the institutional level, it is still important to consider that many 
students who are not eligible for merit-based aid come from disadvantaged backgrounds (e.g., Heller & Marin, 
2002; 2004) and the adoption of merit-based aid has some negative effects on racial minority students (e.g., 
Dynarski, 2004).       
Second, colleges may have used the additional revenue from state merit-based scholarships to subsidize 
their students rather than to reduce the amount of institutional grants per student and secure more revenue. Both 
public and private colleges in many states significantly increased the dollar value of institutional grant that each 
student received. Although it is not clear to whom these colleges distributed the additional institutional aid 
money, they might have spent it on subsidizing out-of-state students or needy students who were not eligible for 
state merit-based scholarships. In either case, the creation of state merit-based scholarships may have allowed 
these colleges to provide more in their institutional grants and enhance college affordability for their students.  
Third, based on my findings, the Bennett hypothesis does not always hold in the context of state merit-
based aid. The Bennett hypothesis assumes that colleges attempt to maximize their utility by raising their tuition 
in response to increases in government financial aid, up to the point where it does not harm their reputation. 
However, my study shows that colleges in many states did not significantly increase their tuition and fees. 
Moreover, except in a couple of states, colleges were not responsive to the incentive embedded in their state’s 
merit-based aid programs. This result further calls into question the validity of the Bennett hypothesis in the 
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context of merit-based aid. The fact that some states intentionally kept college costs low at their public colleges 
suggests that individual institutions might not be capable of raising their tuition even if they would like to.  
All in all, my study demonstrates that there is little empirical evidence to support the Bennett hypothesis. 
As states started new aid programs, students with solid academic records have received monetary subsidies to 
pay for college education. State legislatures can also see that the money they invested in merit-based aid 
programs does not result in unintended consequences such as tuition increases. This study contributes to the 
literature by testing the Bennett hypothesis using all thirteen states that have implemented merit-based aid. In 
particular, results from my study illustrate that academic eligibilities as well as award amounts of merit-based 
aid programs are widely varied across states, and so does the way colleges respond to merit-based aid. My 
results suggest that it is important to consider a merit-based aid program in each state separate and unique rather 
than treat these programs as a similar one.  
Although my study adds to the literature, there are some limitations that my study does not address. 
First, my study does not examine why colleges respond to merit-based aid in certain ways. Although I explore 
possible explanations such as governance structure, testing these possibilities is out of the scope of my study. 
Future research that explores these potential factors will improve our understanding of the economic behavior 
of colleges. Second, it is possible that other factors related to tuition or college finance could have occurred in 
the treatment states at the same time merit-based aid was adopted. For example, a state might have adopted 
performance-based funding in the same year it implemented its merit-based aid program. If this were the case, it 
also could have affected my estimates. Third, although I find increases in institutional grants per student in 
many states, it is not yet clear to whom colleges in these states distributed the money. Did colleges spend their 
money on students who already received merit-based aid to complement their unmet needs, or on students who 
were not eligible for merit-based aid such as low-achieving students or nonresident students? Exploring these 
questions will provide another important, but mostly missing, piece to the puzzle of how colleges respond to 
increased government aid.  
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Lastly, I cannot entirely rule out the possibility that my treatment states (states that have adopted merit-
based aid) tend to change their prices more than the control states regardless of their state merit-based aid 
policy. In Appendix A, I present the results from the falsification test that examines whether colleges in each of 
the treatment states significantly changed their prices more than their control groups at least six years before or 
after their state merit-based aid was implemented.15 Although estimates are widely varied across states, 
estimates in some states are still statistically significant and consistent to the main results. These results suggest 
that colleges in the treatment states were more likely to raise their student charges or decrease the amount of 
institutional aid per student even when merit-based aid was not available, and the main results might just reflect 
these overall trends. The results from the falsification test again support the main conclusion of this study: the 
adoption of merit-based aid does not necessarily lead colleges in most states to take advantage of their state 
merit-based aid by raising college prices.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 I first set the false implementation year as a few years before the actual implementation year in each state because post-policy 
outcome variables could have still been affected by the policy. However, this approach does not work for states that adopted merit-
based aid policy in the early 1990s (e.g., Arkansas, Georgia, etc.) due to the data availability. Therefore, I set a false implementation 
year that is at least six years far from the actual implementation year either before or after the policy.       
	   40	  
References 
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Baum, S., & Ma, J. (2011). Trends in College Pricing 2011. In C. Board (Ed.), Trends in Higher Education Series. New York, NY: 
College Board. 
Bell, A. C., Carnahan, J., & L'Orange, H. P. (2011). State Tuition, Fees, and Financial Assistance Policies, For Public Colleges and 
Universities 2010-11 (7th ed.). Denver, Colorado: State Higher Education Executive Officers. 
Bennett, W. J. (1987, Feb, 18). Our Greedy Colleges, The New York Times.  
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates? The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249-275.  
Bowen, H. R. (1980). The Costs of Higher Education: How Much do Colleges and Universities Spend per Student and How Much 
Should They Spend? San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Calcagno, J. C., & Alfonso, M. (2007). Institutional Responses to State Merit Aid Programs: The Case of Florida Community 
Colleges CCRC Working Paper. New York, NY: Community College Research Center. 
Cheslock, J. J., & Hughes, R. P. (2011). Differences Across States in Higher Education Finance Policy. Working Paper. Center for the 
Study of Higher Education ,The Pennsylvania State University. University Park, PA.  
Christal, M. E. (1997). State Tuition and Fee Policies: 1996-1997 (3rd ed.). Denver, Colorado: State Higher Education Executive 
Officers. 
Cohn, E., & Geske, T. G. (1990). The Economics of Education (3 ed.). Waltham, MA: Elsevier. 
College_Board. (2011). Trends in College Pricing 2011. In C. Board (Ed.), Trends in Higher Education Series. New York, NY: 
College Board. 
Cornwell, C., Mustard, D. B., & Sridhar, D. J. (2006). The Enrollment Effects of Merit-Based Financial Aid: Evidence from Georgia's 
HOPE Program. Journal of Labor Economics, 24(4), 761-786.  
Curs, B. R., & Dar, L. (2010). Does State Financial Aid Affect Institutional Aid? An Analysis of the Role of State Policy on 
Postsecondary Institutional Pricing Strategies. Retrieved from SSRN website:  
Doyle, W. R. (2010). Does Merit-Based Aid "Crowd Out" Need-Based Aid? Research in Higher Education, 51, 397-415.  
Drukker, D. M. (2003). Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models. Stata Journal, 3, 168-177.  
Dynarski, S. (2002). The Consequence of Merit Aid NBER Working Paper Series. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
	   41	  
Dynarski, S. (2004). The New Merit Aid. In C. M. Hoxby (Ed.), College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and 
How to Pay For It (pp. 63-100). Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press. 
Dynarski, S. (2005). Building the Stock of College-Educated Lbor NBER Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Ecomomic Research. 
Heller, D. E. (1997). Student Price Response in Higher Education: An Update to Leslie and Brinkman. The Journal of Higher 
Education, 68(6), 624-659.  
Heller, D. E., & Marin, P. (2002). Who Should We Help? The Negative Social Consequences of Merit Scholarships. Cambridge, MA: 
Civil Rights Project, Harvard University. 
Heller, D. E., & Marin, P. (2004). State Merit Scholarship Programs and Racial Inequality. Cambridge, MA: Civil Rights Project at 
Harvard University. 
Henry, G. T., & Rubenstein, R. (2002). Paying for Grades: Impact of Merit-Based Financial Aid on Educational Quality. Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 21(1), 93-109.  
Henry, G. T., Rubenstein, R., & Bugler, D. T. (2004). Is HOPE Enough? Impacts of Receiving and Losing Merit-Based Financial Aid. 
Educational Policy, 18(5), 686-709.  
Hu, S., Trengove, M., & Zhang, L. (2012). Toward a Greater Understanding of the Effects of State Merit Aid Programs: Examining 
Existing Evidence and Exploring Future Research Direction 
Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research. In J. C. Smart & M. B. Paulsen (Eds.), (Vol. 27, pp. 291-334): Springer 
Netherlands. 
Immerwahr, J., Johnson, J., Ott, A., & Rochkind, J. (2010). Squeeze Play 2010: Continued Public Anxiety on Cost, Harsher 
Judgments on How Colleges Are Run. San Jose, CA: Public Agenda for The National Center for Public Policy and Higher 
Education. 
Krueger, A. O. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. The American Economic Review, 64(3), 291-303.  
Lan, Y., & Winters, J. V. (2011). Did the D.C. Tuition Assistance Grant Program Cause Out-Of-State Tuition to Increase? Economics 
Bulletin, 31(3), 2444-2453.  
Lehr, D. K., & Newton, J. M. (1978). Time Series and Cross-Sectional Investigations of the Demand for Higher Education. Economic 
Inquiry, 16(3), 411-422. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1978.tb00511.x 
Leslie, L. L., & Brinkman, P. T. (1987). Student Price Response in Higher Education: The Student Demand Studies. The Journal of 
Higher Education, 58(2), 181-204.  
	   42	  
Long, B. T. (2004). How do Financial Aid Policies Affect Colleges?The Institutional Impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship. The 
Journal of Human Resources, 39(4), 1045-1066.  
Longanecker, D. (2002). Is Merit-Based Student Aid Really Trumping Need-Based Aid? Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, 
34(2), 30-37.  
Lowry, R. C. (2001). Governmental Structure, Trustee Selection, and Public University Prices and Spending: Multiple Means to 
Similar Ends. American Journal of Political Science, 45(4), 845-861.  
Martin, R. E. (2011). The College Cost Disease. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
McPherson, M. S., & Schapiro, M. O. (1991). The Supply-Side Effects of Student Aid Keeping College Affordable: Government and 
Educational Opportunity (pp. 57-74). Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs. (2011). 41st Annual Survey Report on State-Sponsored Student 
Financial Aid: 2009-2010 Academic Year. Wasington, DC: The National Associaton of State Student Grant and Aid 
Programs. 
Orsuwan, M., & Heck, R. H. (2009). Merit-Based Student Aid and Freshman Interstate College Migration: Testing a Dynamic Model 
of Policy Change. Research in Higher Education, 50, 24-51.  
Pallais, A. (2009). Taking a chance on College: Is the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship Program a Winner? The Journal of 
Human Resources, 44(1), 199-222.  
Pasour Jr, E. G. (1987). Rent Seeking: Some Conceptual Problems and Implications. The Review of Austrian Economics, 1(1), 123-
143.  
Quizon, D. (2011, Apr, 3, 2011). Next in Line for Cuts: Scholarships Designed to Keep Students in Their States, The Chronicle of 
Higher Education.  
Rasmussen, C. J. (2003). State Tuition, Fees, and Financial Assistance Policies, 2002-03 (5th ed.). Denver, Colorado: State Higher 
Education Executive Officers. 
Richard C. Richardson, J., Bracco, K. R., Callan, P. M., & Finney, J. E. (1999). Designing State Higher Education Systems for a New 
Century. Phoenix, Arizona: American Council on Education Oryx Press. 
Rizzo, M., & Ehrenberg, R. G. (2004). Resident and Nonresident Tuition and Enrollment at Flagship State Universities. In C. M. 
Hoxby (Ed.), College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay For It (pp. 303-353). Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Scott-Clayton, J. (2011). On Money and Motivation: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Financial Incentives for College Achievement. 
The Journal of Human Resources, 46(3), 614-646.  
	   43	  
Singell Jr, L. D., Waddell, G. R., & Curs, B. R. (2004). HOPE for the Pell? Institutional Effects in the Intersection of Merit-Based and 
Need-Based Aid. Southern Economic Journal, 73(1), 79-99.  
SingellJr., L. D., & Stone, J. A. (2007). For Whom the Pell Tolls: The Response of University Tuition to Federal Grants-in-aid. 
Economics of Education Review, 26(3), 285-295.  
Stafford, K. L., Lundstedt, S. B., & Lynn, A. D., Jr. (1984). Social and Economic Factors Affecting Participation in Higher Education. 
The Journal of Higher Education, 55(5), 590-608. doi: 10.2307/1981824 
Turner, L. J. (2012). The Incidence of Student Financial Aid: Evidence from the Pell Grant Program. Job Market Paper. Columbia 
University. New York, NY.  
Turner, N. (2012). Who benefits from student aid? The economic incidence of tax-based federal student aid. Economics of Education 
Review, 31(4), 463-481. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.12.008 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2005). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach (3 ed.). Florence, KY: Cengage Learning. 
Zhang, L. (2011). Does Merit-Based Aid Affect Degree Production in STEM Fields?Evidence from Georgia and Florida. The Journal 
of Higher Education, 82(4), 389-415.  
Zhang, L., & Ness, E. C. (2010). Does State Merit-Based Aid Stem Brain Drain? Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 32(2), 
143-165.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   44	  
Appendix A 
Table A.1. Falsification Test Results (Public 4-Year Colleges) 
State 
(Available Years) 
Control States Tuition & Fees 
(1) 
Institutional Grants 
(2) 
Room & Board Charges 
(3) 
Arkansas RC 57% N/A 0% 
(7 years) All 57% N/A 0% 
Florida RC 100% 0% N/A 
(1 year) All N/A 0% 0% 
Georgia RC 100% 0% 80% 
(5 years) All 100% 0% 40% 
Kentucky RC 100% N/A N/A 
(2 years) All 100% N/A N/A 
Louisiana RC N/A N/A 0% 
(1 year) All N/A N/A 0% 
Massachusetts RC 13% 13% 0% 
(8 years) All 38% 88% 25% 
Michigan RC N/A N/A 0% 
(3 years) All 33% N/A 0% 
Mississippi RC 100% 0% N/A 
(2 years) All 100% 0% N/A 
Nevada RC 0% 0% 0% 
(3 years) All N/A 0% 0% 
New Mexico RC N/A N/A 0% 
(1 year) All 100% 0% N/A 
South Carolina RC 0% N/A 0% 
(1 year) All 0% N/A 0% 
Tennessee RC N/A N/A 50% 
(7 years) All N/A N/A 43% 
West Virginia RC N/A N/A 0% 
(5 years) All N/A 0% 0% 
Note: I run the same model as specified in equation (1) for all years available at least six years far from its actual implementation year. 
For example, Arkansas implemented merit-based aid policy in 1991. Thus, I set its false implementation year as every year from 1998 
to 2004, run my model for each of the false years, and see if the result is consistent to the main result. The percentage terms in the 
table indicate the percentage of false years that show consistent results among all available false years. RC means that I compare 
colleges in the treatment state to colleges in states that belong to the same regional compact and that had not adopted merit-based aid 
during the time period. N/A refers to “not applicable” because the main result is not statistically significant.  
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Table A.2. Falsification Test Results (Private 4-Year Colleges) 
State 
(Available Years) 
Control Groups Tuition & Fees 
(1) 
Institutional Grants 
(2) 
Room & Board Charges 
(3) 
Arkansas RC 86% 57% 86% 
(7 years) All 86% 43% 100% 
Florida RC N/A 0% N/A 
(1 year) All 0% 0% 0% 
Georgia RC 40% 20% 20% 
(5 years) All 40% 20% 20% 
Kentucky RC N/A N/A 0% 
(2 years) All 100% N/A 0% 
Louisiana RC N/A 0% N/A 
(1 year) All 0% 0% N/A 
Massachusetts RC N/A N/A N/A 
(8 years) All 63% 13% 63% 
Michigan RC 0% 100% N/A 
(3 years) All 0% 100% 33% 
Mississippi RC N/A 0% 100% 
(2 years) All N/A 0% 100% 
Nevada RC 100% 100% N/A 
(3 years) All 100% 67% N/A 
New Mexico RC 100% 100% 0% 
(1 year) All 100% 100% 0% 
South Carolina RC N/A 100% 0% 
(1 year) All 0% 100% 0% 
Tennessee RC 0% N/A 57% 
(7 years) All N/A 57% N/A 
West Virginia RC N/A 40% N/A 
(5 years) All 100% 40% N/A 
Note: I run the same model as specified in equation (1) for all years available at least six years far from its actual implementation year. 
For example, Arkansas implemented merit-based aid policy in 1991. Thus, I set its false implementation year as every year from 1998 
to 2004, run my model for each of the false years, and see if the result is consistent to the main result. The percentage terms in the 
table indicate the percentage of false years that show consistent results among all available false years. RC means that I compare 
colleges in the treatment state to colleges in states that belong to the same regional compact and that had not adopted merit-based aid 
during the time period. N/A refers to “not applicable” because the main result is not statistically significant.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
Does Merit-Based Aid Promote Degree Attainment?  
 
Abstract 
This study examines whether receiving merit-based aid affects the probability of earning a bachelor’s 
degree within six years. Using an example of Tennessee, I compare students who received the state’s merit-
based aid to students who did not. I employ the regression discontinuity method, which minimizes pre-existing 
differences between scholarship recipients and non-recipients. Results show that receiving merit-based aid 
increases the probability of earning a bachelor’s degree in the fourth year. However, it does not affect whether a 
student obtains the degree or not in the fifth or sixth year. Possible explanations as to why merit-based aid does 
not affect degree attainment will be discussed.        
 
Key words: merit-based aid, graduation, time to degree 
 
Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, more than a dozen states have adopted state-funded merit-based aid. By providing 
funding for merit-base aid, states aim to keep the bright and best students within their states and produce 
college-educated workers who are critical for their economy (Hu, Trengove, & Zhang, 2012). Many researchers 
agree that state-funded merit-based aid increases college enrollment for its state residents at the entry level 
(Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2002; Goodman, 2008). However, its effect on persistence 
graduation has received less attention (Dynarski, 2005; Scott-Clayton, 2011).   
College graduation is important not only for students but also for states. It is widely known that those 
with a college degree enjoy higher wages in the labor market compared to those without a college degree (Card, 
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1999; Kane & Rouse, 1995). From the perspective of states, it is also important to ensure that their students earn 
college degrees given the vast amount of state funding spent on public colleges and student aid (NASSGAP, 
2011).  
Despite the importance of postsecondary educational attainment, relatively little is known about the 
relationship between financial aid and college graduation. There is a long line of research about the effect of 
financial aid on either initial enrollment or year-to-year persistence (Heller, 1997; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). 
However, most of the studies do not investigate if the initial enrollment or persistence translates into graduation. 
Moreover, there are mixed results about the effect of financial aid on persistence and graduation (Hossler et al., 
2009). Some researchers find positive effects (e.g., Dynarski, 2003), while others do not find any significant 
impact (e.g., Castlemen, Long, & Willett, 2010).  
In this study, I examine whether or not receiving merit-based aid affects graduation within six years in 
the case of Tennessee. In 2004, Tennessee implemented its merit-based aid, Tennessee Educational Lottery 
Scholarships (TELS). Among the fall 2004 entering cohort, students who scored a 19 on ACT or received a B 
grade in high school were eligible for the scholarships. As the scholarships were awarded based on pre-
determined scores, I employ the regression discontinuity method that reduces selection bias by focusing on 
students near the cut-off scores. I find that receiving merit-based aid does not affect whether or not students 
earn a bachelor’s degree anytime within six years. Instead, it appears to increase the probability of attaining the 
degree in the fourth year.  
This paper is organized as follows. I first introduce Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarships as 
background information. Then, I briefly explain the theoretical background of this study, the human capital 
theory, and summarize previous studies that examine the effect of financial aid (especially, merit-based aid) on 
degree attainment. In the next section, I describe research methods, data, and sample used in this study. Then, I 
present my results and conclusions.  
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Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarships 
In Tennessee, TELS was first awarded for the fall 2004 incoming cohort. It consists of five sub-
categories based on a student’s family income and academic achievement. Of the five programs, the Wilder-
Naifeh program is available only for students enrolled in Tennessee Technological Centers. The other four 
programs are available for state residents who are enrolled at least part-time in one of the state’s public or 
private colleges. To be eligible, students were required to have at least a 19 ACT score or a 3.0 high school 
GPA. An additional $1,000 was awarded for either highest-achieving students who received a 27 ACT score 
and a 3.75 GPA or low-income students whose annual family income was below $36,000.16  Once students 
receive the scholarships, they must renew their scholarship eligibility periodically by maintaining a 3.0 
cumulative GPA. Students can receive the scholarships for up to five years or 120 college credits, whichever 
comes first.  
Compared to other states’ merit-based aid, TELS is unique in terms of its initial academic requirements 
and income supplements. Although many states require both standardized test scores and high school grades in 
order for students to be eligible for their merit-based aid, students in Tennessee are required to meet only one of 
the standards. In the first year of implementation, the ACT cut-off score in Tennessee (19) was even lower than 
that in neighboring states, such as Florida (20), Louisiana (20), or West Virginia (22). In addition, even if 
students failed to meet the base criteria, there is a second chance for students from low-income families. The 
Access grant, one of the sub-categories of TELS, is only available for low-income students who received at 
least a score of 18 on the ACT and a 2.75 high school GPA. As its name suggests, this program aims to promote 
college access for low-income students by slightly lowering the academic standards required for TELS. Under 
the former rules, low-income students who met the base criteria (either a 19 ACT score or a 3.0 high school 
GPA) received the ASPIRE grant which awarded an additional $1,000 per year.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The awarding rules have changed since 2005. In 2005, the ACT cut-off score was raised from 19 to 21. The additional award 
amount for low-income students was also increased from $1,000 to $1,500. Because I look at the fall 2004 cohort in my study, I use 
the former rules throughout the study.  
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The relatively less rigorous academic standards and the provision of income supplements are designed to 
address the major weakness of merit-based aid: the disproportionate distribution of the aid to students from 
middle- and high-income families (Heller & Marin, 2002; 2004). Of TELS recipients who entered public four-
year colleges in Fall 2004, approximately 27% of students were from low-income families and received either 
the ASPIRE or the Access grant (THEC, 2011).17 However, it is not clear whether these scholarships help 
students succeed in college. The six-year graduation rates of the ASPIRE and Access grants recipients are 44% 
and 30%, respectively. These are lower than the state average graduation rates by more than 10%.  
 
Theoretical Background 
The human capital theory is used as a theoretical background for this study. Based on economic theory, 
this framework assumes that students are rational actors who pursue maximizing their utility among different 
sets of choices such as whether or not to go to college. In other words, students consider benefits and costs of 
each alternative and choose the one that satisfies them the most. Although utility includes both monetary and 
non-monetary values, most research using the human capital framework focuses on monetary benefits and costs 
of college education. This calculation can be simplified as equation (1).  
 
                                                                                                                        (1) 
 
Equation (1) illustrates future earnings and costs associated with college education. When a student has s 
years of college education, this generates direct and indirect costs of college education, .  Direct costs include 
tuition, fees, and living expenses, while indirect costs mean a student’s foregone earnings, which (s)he would 
have earned if (s)he had a job right after graduating from high school. After s years of college education, (s)he 
expects annual earnings of  until (s)he retires in year t. Because both benefits and costs of college education 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The statistics in this paragraph are calculated by the author based on Table 51 in the state’s annual report (THEC, 2011, p. 65).  
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occur in the future, both of them are discounted at a rate of i, which is equivalent to an interest rate. The human 
capital theory assumes that students can borrow money at a rate of i from the market to invest in their education 
(Schultz, 1961).  
When students decide whether to pursue another year of college education, they weigh the present value 
of the benefits to the present value of costs associated with another year of education. Then, students decide to 
attend another year of education only if the benefits are larger than the costs. In this study, receiving statewide 
merit-based aid will increase the estimate of equation (1) by reducing the direct costs of college education ( ). 
When other things are held constant, I hypothesize that receiving merit-based aid will lead students to attend 
another year of college.   
 
Literature Review 
There are several ways that financial aid promotes college participation and graduation. Most 
importantly, financial aid reduces direct costs of college education by providing students with monetary support 
to pay their tuition. This monetary support allows students to postpone or reduce their labor market participation 
and spend more time on campus. As students spend more time on campus, they can put more effort into 
academic activities and interact more with their peers and faculty members. Therefore, students are 
academically and socially integrated into their institutions, which eventually leads to their college success 
(Tinto, 2010). If a student received institutional aid, it would also convey the message that the student is valued 
in her institution. This can have positive psychological effects on the student and increase the student’s loyalty 
to her institution (DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2002).  
In addition to the monetary, social, and psychological frameworks, Scott-Clayton (2011) demonstrates 
that state merit-based aid incentivizes students to work hard in college. Because most state merit-based aid 
programs require students to renew their scholarship eligibility by maintaining their cumulative GPA above a 
certain level, students put effort into getting good grades in class, which in turn leads to their persistence and 
€ 
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on-time graduation. However, Binder, Ganderton, and Hutchens (2002) propose that the renewal requirement 
might discourage students who fail to renew their eligibility from pursuing further education due either to 
financial or psychological costs. This is plausible especially if a state sets a relatively lower initial requirement 
and induces students who would not have attended college at all to attend one (or students who would have 
gone to two-year colleges to attend four-year colleges).  
To date, there are only a few studies that directly examine the effect of merit-based aid on graduation. 
Scott-Clayton (2011) examines the effect of West Virginia’s PROMISE scholarship on bachelor’s degree 
attainment. Using regression discontinuity and cohort analysis methods, she finds that scholarship recipients 
were six to nine percent more likely to earn a bachelor’s degree than non-recipients were. She argues that at 
least part of the positive effect can be attributed to the incentive embedded in the PROMISE scholarship. In 
addition to maintaining a 3.0 cumulative GPA, students are required to take 30 credits per year to renew their 
scholarship eligibility, and they can renew it for up to four years. If it adds up, students can complete 120 
credits within four years, which is generally required to earn a bachelor’s degree. As evidence of this incentive 
working, she shows that scholarship recipients were more likely to take 30 credits per year and maintained a 3.0 
GPA than non-recipients were. However, these positive outcomes are only observed until the end of students’ 
junior year because they could not renew their eligibility anyway after that time. Her study indicates that 
scholarship recipients respond to incentive generated from their merit-based aid design, and it helps them 
successfully graduate from college on time.   
Henry, Rubenstein, and Bugler (2004) examine whether receiving HOPE scholarships affects college 
GPAs, the number of college credits, persistence, 18 and four-year graduation. In order to minimize selection 
bias, the authors focus on students whose high school GPAs were close to the cut-off GPAs required for the 
scholarships and match recipients with non-recipients in terms of high school GPAs and institutions they 
attended. The authors find that scholarship recipients earned more credits, had higher GPAs, and were more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In the article, persistence is defined as being enrolled in one of the public colleges in Georgia without graduating from college 
within four years of initial enrollment.  
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likely to graduate than non-recipients. However, the positive impact on graduation disappears if students who 
initially received the scholarships lost them later. Results from this study show that the actual effect of state 
merit-based aid on graduation could be smaller than its intended effects because many students fail to renew 
their scholarship eligibility and lose it.  
Castleman (2013) examines whether the different amount of merit-based aid makes a difference in 
credits completed and degree attainment. Florida’s Bright Future Scholarships (BFS) is a two-tiered program 
that covers either 100% (the Florida Academic Scholars) or 75% (the Florida Medallion Scholars) of tuition and 
fees in the state’s public colleges depending on students’ academic achievement. Using the difference-in-
differences method, the author compares the outcomes (credits completed and degree attainment) of three 
different cohorts who graduated from high schools in the state and attended in-state public colleges. He finds 
that there is almost no difference in the outcomes between non-recipients and FMS recipients even after the 
BFS was implemented. In contrast, FAS recipients completed more college courses and were more likely to 
earn a college degree than FMS recipients, after the implementation of the scholarships. That is, awarding 100% 
subsidy significantly promoted degree attainment, while 75% subsidy did not. The author attributes the positive 
outcomes observed among FAS students to the change in student composition rather than the scholarship award 
itself. The BFS induced FAS-eligible students who would have gone to private or out-of-state colleges to their 
in-state public colleges. Therefore, the increased number of highest-achieving students in the state’s public 
colleges contributed to the improved degree attainment probabilities.     
Merit-based aid appears to increase college completion rates at the state level, too. Employing the 
difference-in-differences method to analyze the 2000 Census data, Dynarski (2005) finds that the percentage of 
young adults with at least an associate’s degree has increased by three to four percent since the inception of 
merit-based aid in Arkansas and Georgia. The positive impact is larger for women than men. Since the policy 
was adopted, the percentage of young adults with bachelor’s degrees has increased in all racial and gender 
groups except white male. Zhang (2011) also uses the difference-in-differences method to examine whether 
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merit-based aid programs in Georgia and Florida increased the number and percentage of bachelor’s degree 
holders, especially focusing on STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) fields. Georgia and 
Florida experienced 1.8% and 11.8% increases in the number of bachelor’s degree holders, respectively. In 
addition, both states observed increases in the number of bachelor’s degree holders in STEM as well as non-
STEM majors. This result raises a question on the current argument that adopting merit-based aid discourages 
students from choosing STEM majors, in which it is more difficult to receive good grades.  
Recently, there are a growing number of studies that employ experimental or quasi-experimental 
methods to analyze the persistence and graduation effects of need-based grants. However, their results regarding 
whether need-based aid promotes student success are mixed. For example, MDRC randomly assigned need-
based grants to low-income college students depending on students’ academic performances19 at seven different 
research sites. Although it is too early to evaluate its impact on graduation in most sites, students who received 
the aid were more likely to earn an associate’s degree than non-recipients in Ohio (Patel, Richburg-Hayes, 
Campa, & Rudd, 2013).20 In contrast, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) argue that financial aid is not 
enough to improve graduation. In Berea College where all students received subsidies for full tuition and a 
significant portion of room and board charges, the average graduation rate21 was as low as 47%, which was 
slightly lower than the national average for not-for-profit four-year private colleges. Several studies using quasi-
experimental methods find the positive impact of need-based aid on degree attainment (e.g., Dynarski, 2003), 
while others do not (e.g., Castlemen, Long, & Willett, 201022).  
To summarize, merit-based aid appears to have positive effects on degree attainment. However, there 
are only a few studies in this area, and most of them focus only on a few states with merit-based aid. If I look at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Although the specific rules differ across research sites, students are usually required to enroll in part-time and maintain a C grade in 
each semester. Need-based grants are awarded three times within a semester as students meet these requirements throughout the 
semester.    
20 The MDRC interventions also include other components (e.g., counseling) in addition to financial aid. Thus, it is not clear whether 
all of the positive effect observed can be attributed to the need-based grants.    
21 In the research, the authors define graduation rates as the percentage of matriculating students who returned to their school at the 
seventh semester. The authors explain that almost every student who came back at the seventh semester eventually graduated 
(Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2003, p. 598).   
22 The authors use both regression discontinuity and event history models, and find the positive impact of need-based grants only 
among high-achieving students in the event history model. 
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the question more broadly including need-based aid, it is not yet clear whether financial aid promotes degree 
attainment. My study adds to the literature by examining the effect of merit-based aid on graduation using the 
example of Tennessee. Tennessee is an interesting example especially because the state sets less rigorous 
standards and provides more generous funding for low-income students.  
 
Data, Sample & Methods 
I use administrative data in Tennessee for the fall 2004 entering cohort. The data contains information 
about students who entered one of the public four-year colleges in the state in fall 2004. Because the data covers 
all students in the state’s public four-year colleges, I can track students as long as they remain in one of the 
state’s public four-year colleges. The data provides information on students’ demographics, parental educational 
levels, Pell Grants eligibility23, amount of need- and merit-based aid from the state (Tennessee), institution’s 
name, enrollment status, high school grades, and standardized test scores. This rich set of data allows me to 
control for factors that are known to affect college persistence and completion at both individual and 
institutional levels.  
Among the fall 2004 cohort, I limit my sample to first-time freshmen students who graduated from high 
school no earlier than 2003 and who started at one of the public four-year colleges in Tennessee in the fall of 
2004. I exclude non-traditional students (adult students who delayed their college entry) because they are 
different from traditional students in terms of demographic, enrollment, and course-taking patterns. These 
different characteristics are associated with persistence and graduation (Adelman, 2006). Moreover, for the fall 
2004 cohort, adult students who delayed college entry more than 16 months of high school graduation were not 
eligible for TELS in the first place. I also limit my sample to students who were Tennessee residents and 
registered for at least six credits during their first semester. These two conditions (state residency and part-time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Although the data set has an annual family income variable (a continuous variable), its value is missing for 43.5% of my sample. 
Due to the substantial number of missing values, I will use a variable that indicates whether or not a student is eligible for Pell Grants 
as a proxy for family income.   
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status) are basic requirements to be eligible for TELS. As a result, I have 14,391 first-time freshmen students in 
my sample. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for my sample broken down by their TELS receipt status.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
 Not received Received Total 
Female 0.551 
(0.498) 
0.551 
(0.497) 
0.551 
(0.497) 
Racial Minority 0.433 
(0.496) 
0.183 
(0.387) 
0.213 
(0.409) 
Pell-Eligible 0.591 
(0.492) 
0.294 
(0.456) 
0.320 
(0.467) 
College-Educated 
Parent(s) 
0.439 
(0.496) 
0.689 
(0.463) 
0.659 
(0.474) 
High School GPA 2.809 
(0.488) 
3.329 
(0.499) 
3.270 
(0.525) 
ACT score 18.83 
(3.686) 
22.95 
(3.746) 
22.47 
(3.965) 
Graduation rates 
(within six years) 
0.253 
(0.435) 
0.546 
(0.498) 
0.511 
(0.500) 
Sample size 1,722 
(11.97%) 
12,669 
(84.85%) 
14,391 
(100%) 
Note: When I calculated the average high school GPA, I dropped GED students. In the data set, their high school GPAs actually mean 
their GED scores.   
 
According to Table 1, approximately 85% of my sample received TELS when they entered college. 
Overall, more than one-half of the sample is female students. 21% of the sample is racial minority students 
(African-American, Hispanic, Native American, and multiracial students), and 51% of the sample graduated 
within six years of their initial enrollment. When I compare TELS recipients to non-recipients, the two groups 
are different in terms of racial composition, parental education, family income, and academic performances. On 
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average, the proportion of racial minority and Pell-grants-eligible students is much higher among non-recipients 
than recipients. Non-recipients have relatively low high school GPAs, ACT scores, and graduation rates. 
Because the two groups are very different in terms of family background and academic performances, the 
graduation rate gap between the two groups cannot be solely attributed to TELS. 
Using the sample, I use logistic regression and regression discontinuity models to examine whether 
receiving merit-based aid affects graduation in a given year. In order to examine the effect of merit-based aid, I 
first compare scholarship recipients to non-recipients using a logistic regression model as specified in equation 
(2).  
 
€ 
Pr(yi =1) =
1
1+ exp−(α+β (TELSi )+δX i ) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2) 
 
In equation (2), the outcome variable (
€ 
Pr(yi =1)) is the probability of a student earning a bachelor’s 
degree within six years. In addition, I also examine if a student earned the degree at the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
year after their initial enrollment in order to see if merit-based aid affects the duration it takes to earn a 
bachelor’s degree. Throughout the study, whether students graduated from their first institution does not matter 
for two reasons. First, a large number of students attend more than one institution throughout their college years 
(Adelman, 2006). Excluding these students from the sample would underestimate the number of college 
graduates. Second, students are eligible for TELS as long as they remain in in-state colleges. Hence, any 
potential effect of TELS would be observed even if students transferred to another institution in the state.  
The key independent variable ( ) takes on a value of one if a student received one of the TELS 
awards in his/her first year and zero otherwise. 
€ 
β  refers to the effect of receiving the scholarships on 
graduation.	  Because some of the initial recipients lost their award after a couple of years, the estimate is an 
intent-to-treat estimate and could be smaller than treatment-on-the-treated estimate. I also add a vector of 
€ 
TELSi
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covariates  ( ) to take into account effects of a student’s demographics, family background, and academic 
performances (Adelman, 2006). Table 2 summarizes the variables used in this study.  
 
Table 2. Descriptions of Variables Used 
Type Variable Description 
Outcome Variable Graduation 1: If a student earns a bachelor’s degree within six years of initial 
enrollment 
0: Otherwise 
Independent 
Variable 
Receiving TELS 1: If a student received one type of the TELS awards in their first 
year 
0: Otherwise 
Assignment 
Variables 
ACT scores Continuous variable that indicates a student’s ACT composite 
score (centered at 19) 
High School GPA Continuous variable that indicates a student’s cumulative high 
school GPA (centered at 3.0)  
Control variables Female 1: Female 
0: Male 
Racial Minority 1: African-American, Hispanic, Native American, or Multiracial 
students 
0: White or Asian students  
Pell Grants Eligibility 1: Being eligible for Pell Grants 
0: Otherwise 
Parental Education 1: At least one parent has some college experience 
0: Neither parents has attended college 
Institutions A binary variable that indicates the institution in which a student 
was enrolled during his/her first year  
 
Although the logistic model estimates the effect of receiving merit-based aid after taking into account a 
student’s family background and academic achievement, the estimate still reflects unobservable differences 
€ 
Xi
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between recipients and non-recipients. For example, scholarship recipients with a 30 ACT score and a 4.0 high 
school GPA might be more motivated than non-recipients with a 16 ACT score and a 2.0 high school GPA. 
These students’ different levels of motivation could affect their college outcomes, including graduation. 
Therefore, I use the regression discontinuity model that minimizes both observable and non-observable 
differences between the two groups by comparing students in the two groups who are close to the cut-off score.   
The regression discontinuity method is used when treatment is assigned based on a pre-determined 
arbitrary rule, such as the TELS eligibility requirements in Tennessee (Schneider et al., 2007). In order to be 
eligible for TELS, students whose family income was above $36,000 had to score a 19 on the ACT exam or 
receive a 3.0 high school GPA. Students who did not meet the GPA standard received the scholarships if their 
ACT score was at or above 19. However, the cut-off score of 19 is somewhat arbitrary. In the absence of the 
scholarships, there is no reason to believe that students with a 19 ACT score would be considerably more likely 
to graduate than students with an 18 ACT score. The former would do a little better than the latter because 
standardized test scores indicate academic capability to some extent; however, there would not be a clear gap in 
graduation probabilities between the two groups in the absence of the scholarships. This continuity in an 
outcome variable is a key assumption of the regression discontinuity method (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008).   
The continuity assumption cannot be directly tested because it is impossible to observe what would have 
happened in the absence of the treatment(in this study, the TELS award). Instead, researchers test whether 
students on both sides are similar except for the treatment, given that the cut-off score is arbitrary. If students 
are identical in many ways except for whether they receive the treatment, any difference in their outcome can be 
attributed to the treatment. However, if students are significantly different in many ways, these different 
characteristics will affect their outcome as well, which makes it difficult to find the net effect of the treatment. 
In order to test whether students are similar, I create several plots of each of covariates against each of the 
assignment variables (ACT score and high school GPA).  
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Second, when using the regression discontinuity method, it is important to ensure that students are not 
able to fully control their assignment variable (McCrary, 2008). For example, some students in my study who 
were especially determined to receive the scholarships may have put in extra effort to meet the criteria and 
consequently received them. If this happened, students who met the criteria by a slight margin would be 
different from students who just missed them. Hence, comparing these two students might overestimate the 
effects of the scholarships. In order to see if there is evidence of student manipulation, I run a McCrary test on 
both ACT scores and high school GPAs. I present these test results in the results section.   
Lastly, it is important to choose an appropriate bandwidth. A narrow bandwidth minimizes bias by 
including students who are very similar to each other, while a wide bandwidth improves precision by increasing 
the sample size used in analysis. Jacob and Zhu (2012) introduce two procedures that are commonly used to 
find optimal bandwidths: the cross-validation procedure and the plug-in procedure. After conducting 
simulations, the authors report that estimates from both approaches are qualitatively similar, even if the optimal 
bandwidths are different. In this study, I utilize both procedures24 and find that my estimates are similar in both 
approaches. Hence, I report my estimates using the optimal bandwidth calculated through the cross-validation 
approach. I also run my model using 50% and 200% of the optimal bandwidth to see if my estimates are 
sensitive to the bandwidth selection.  
There are two types of regression discontinuity models: a sharp regression discontinuity model and a 
fuzzy regression discontinuity model. In this study, I use the fuzzy regression discontinuity model. A fuzzy 
model is used when receiving treatment is not fully determined by assignment variables (Imbens & Lemieux, 
2008). For example, it is possible, although very unlikely, that some students who met all the requirements 
chose not to receive the scholarships for some reason. In my study, 6% of students fall into this category. More 
importantly, I employ the fuzzy model because I have to exclude Access grantees from my study. As previously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I follow Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for the cross-validation approach and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) for the plug-in 
procedure. The latter is the default option for the rd command in STATA. When I use ACT scores as a forcing variable, I use a 
slightly larger bandwidth than the optimal bandwidths calculated using the two procedures, not only because the procedures are 
designed for the sharp regression discontinuity model but also because the sample size is too small within the optimal bandwidths.  
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mentioned, students whose annual family income was below $36,000 could be eligible for TELS if they 
received a 18 on the ACT exam and a 2.75 high school GPA. I first attempt to compare these students to other 
low-income students who just missed the Access grant. Unfortunately, the family income variable is missing for 
43% of my sample, which makes it difficult to identify the counterfactual (students who would have received 
the Access grant if they had met the academic criteria). Moreover, there are only 53 students who actually 
received the Access grant among the fall 2004 cohort. This number amounts to 0.37% of my sample. Therefore, 
it appears that excluding the Access grantees from my study does not significantly change the estimates. After 
excluding these students, there are still a few students who received the scholarships even though they failed to 
meet the academic criteria. The fuzzy model is also appropriate when there are non-compliance cases such as 
these students.   
The fuzzy model assumes that the academic criteria (ACT score and high school GPA) predict whether 
students received one of the awards, but do not perfectly determine it. The fuzzy model is estimated using the 
two-stage least squares model that is mathematically equivalent to the instrumental variable model (Imbens & 
Lemieux, 2008). In the first stage, as specified in equation (3), I predict , which indicates whether students 
received one of the TELS awards (excluding the Access grant). This is predicted by whether students met either 
one of the academic requirements ( ). The case of Tennessee is somewhat complicated because students 
were required to meet either one of the criteria, not both. Hence, I limit my sample to students who failed to 
meet one requirement (e.g., GPA) and then look at students who met or missed on the other requirement (e.g., 
ACT) by a slight margin. In case the relationship between the running variables and the outcome variable is 
quadratic rather than linear, I include the square term of each of the running variables in the model. Lastly, I 
include a set of covariates ( ) that are included in the logistic model as in equation (2). Although adding 
covariates does not change the point estimate, it generally increases precision of the estimates (Imbens & 
Lemieux, 2008).   
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Equation (4) shows the second-stage model. In the second stage, I use the predicted value of receiving 
the scholarships ( ) and estimate whether receiving the scholarships has any impact on graduation ( ). If 
receiving the scholarships has a positive influence on graduation, 	  will be positive and significant. If it does 
not have an impact, 	  will not be statistically different from zero. Again, I include my running variables and a 
set of covariates ( ) that take into account the effects of student and institutional characteristics.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3) 
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  (4) 
 
There are several limitations of my study. Above all, estimates from this study may not be interpreted as 
causal, due to the difference between scholarship recipients and non-recipients. As I will explain in the next 
section, there is evidence of student manipulation in my data. This indicates that students on either side of the 
threshold could be different in terms of unobservable factors. In addition, I also find that racial minority 
students and low-income students are better represented among non-recipients than recipients. To the extent that 
these two groups are different, the regression discontinuity model in my study significantly reduces, but does 
not entirely remove, potential selection bias. Second, results from this study may not be applicable to students at 
the very top or bottom of the ACT score (or high school GPA) distribution. Because the regression discontinuity 
model focuses on a narrow range of students who met or missed the academic criteria by a slight margin, my 
results may not be generalizable to students who do very well or poorly in school. Third, there is a measurement 
error in the key independent variable. Although it is fairly accurate for most students, I find that some students 
who are coded as non-recipients lose their aid after their first year. I treat these students as scholarship 
recipients because it is impossible to lose a scholarship unless they have already received it. If my identification 
of scholarship recipients was incorrect, my estimates may have been biased downward. Lastly, this study 
focuses on the effect of receiving a specific financial aid program, TELS, on graduation rather than considering 
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other relevant predictors such as students’ academic or social integration to their institutions. However, even 
when students received the scholarships, their college experiences could be very different from each other, and 
their different experiences could lead to different graduation outcomes. Due to data availability, I leave the 
effect of these relevant predictors as a limitation of this study.             
 
Results 
I first present estimates from the logistic regression model, and then proceed to results from the 
regression discontinuity model. Table 3 presents my results from the logistic regression model. In order to 
compare coefficients from the logistic regression model to the ones from the regression discontinuity model, I 
present raw coefficients in Table 3.25 According to model 1, receiving TELS is positively associated with 
graduating any time within six years. Although the effect is large and statistically significant, it still reflects 
observable differences between recipients and non-recipients. To control for their observable differences, I add 
a variety of covariates in my model, as in model 5. In model 5, even after taking into account the observable 
differences between the two groups, receiving the scholarships is positively and significantly associated with 
graduating from college within six years. Although the magnitude of the coefficient shrinks in half, it is still 
statistically significant. That is, based on the logistic regression model, students who received TELS had higher 
probability of earning a bachelor’s degree within six years than students who did not. This positive effect of 
receiving the scholarships is consistent even when I break down the graduation variable into fourth-year, fifth-
year, and sixth-year graduation. The results for these three outcome variables are available upon request. 
In addition to the key independent variable, other student characteristics are also significantly related to 
college graduation. Female students, students with at least one college-educated parent, and students with 
higher test scores or high school grades have higher probabilities of graduation than male students, first-
generation students, and students with lower academic performances. Being racial minority or eligible for Pell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  For ease of interpretation, I also provide the same results in odds-ratio in Appendix B.	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Grants are negatively associated with graduation. These results are consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Adelman, 2006).   
 
Table 3. Logistic Regression Results 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
TELS 1.272*** 
(0.058) 
1.150*** 
(0.059) 
1.221*** 
(0.075) 
0.645*** 
(0.082) 
0.645*** 
(0.083) 
Female  0.314*** 
(0.035) 
0.365*** 
(0.036) 
0.236*** 
(0.039) 
0.270*** 
(0.039) 
Minority  -0.593*** 
(0.044) 
-0.432*** 
(0.047) 
-0.109* 
(0.051) 
-0.126* 
(0.054) 
Pell Eligible   -0.560*** 
(0.041) 
-0.524*** 
(0.043) 
-0.525*** 
(0.043) 
Parental 
Education 
  0.364*** 
(0.039) 
0.332*** 
(0.041) 
0.307*** 
(0.041) 
HS GPA    1.074*** 
(0.042) 
1.044*** 
(0.042) 
ACT Score    0.046*** 
(0.006) 
0.040*** 
(0.006) 
Institution 
Dummy 
No No No No Yes 
Note: p-value: *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
Note: 95% Confidence Intervals are reported in parentheses.  
 
Although logistic regression results consistently report the positive impact of receiving TELS, the 
estimates still reflect unobservable differences (e.g., motivation) between recipients and non-recipients. Hence, 
I run the regression discontinuity model that focus on students near the cut-off score with an assumption that 
these students are very similar except whether they received the scholarships. Given the assumption, any 
difference observed in the outcome variable can be attributed to the scholarships.  
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Before presenting the regression discontinuity estimates, I examine if my data meets the key 
assumptions of the regression discontinuity method. First, I check whether the scholarships were awarded based 
on the rules. Because I limit my sample to students who met all basic eligibility requirements (e.g., residency) 
for TELS, the only reason for not receiving the scholarships should be either their test scores or high school 
GPAs. Overall, about 6% of eligible students did not receive the scholarships, and about 10% of students who 
failed to meet the academic requirements received them anyway. Considering that there is almost no way to 
receive the aid without satisfying the academic requirements, some of these students might be falsely identified 
due to measurement error that I discussed previously.  
I then check to see if there is a significant break in the probability of receiving TELS near the cut-off 
scores. If the scholarships were awarded based on the eligibility requirements, the probability should jump from 
zero to one at the cut-off scores. Figures 1 and 2 provide that this is not always the case. Figure 1 shows the 
probability of receiving TELS among students who did not meet the high school GPA requirement. Because 
they failed to meet the GPA requirement, they had to score at least a 19 on the ACT exam to be eligible for 
TELS. In Figure 1, almost every student who met the ACT standard received the award. The probability is near 
one on the right side of the figure. In contrast, there are still many students who received the award anyway 
without satisfying the requirement. Although I see a big and clear gap in the probability at the cut-off score, it is 
still puzzling to see many non-compliance cases.  
Figure 2 shows the probability of receiving TELS among students who failed to meet the ACT 
requirement. Again, because these students did not meet the ACT requirement, they had to have at least a 3.0 
high school GPA to be eligible. Unfortunately, the non-compliance issue appears more serious in this case. 
Although there is a gap in the probability around the 3.0 cut-off point, many students below the threshold still 
received the aid.26 Due to these non-compliance cases, I use the fuzzy discontinuity model. In addition, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 While I acknowledge the issue of non-compliance, it is noteworthy that the small sample size on the left side (ineligible students) 
makes the issue look more serious. Because it is expressed in terms of probabilities, only a couple of non-compliance cases out of a 
few students could result in high probabilities. This also partially explains why the non-compliance issue looks more serious in Figure 
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throughout the study, I focus on the model using ACT scores as an assignment variable than the one using high 
school grades because the former is more accurate in predicting whether students received the scholarships. 
Results from the latter model will be presented as complementary.  
 
	  
Figure 1. Probability of Receiving TELS based on ACT scores 
(among students who did not meet the GPA requirement) 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. Because the unit of GPA is much smaller than that of ACT scores, the number of students in one unit of GPA (0.01) is much 
smaller than that of ACT scores (1 point).     
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Figure 2. Probability of Receiving TELS based on High School GPAs 
(among students who did not meet the ACT requirement) 	  
 
Next, I also examine if there is evidence of student manipulation. I first present a density plot of ACT 
scores and high school GPAs as seen in Figures 3 and 4. In both cases, the density is approximately normally 
distributed, while it is peaked near the cut-off scores. In order to see if the density significantly jumps at the cut-
off scores, I run the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008). Figures 5 and 6 as well as Table 4 suggest that the number 
of students suddenly increases right after the cut-off scores, which suggests possible student manipulation.  
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Figure 3. Density of ACT Scores 
(among students who did not meet the GPA requirement) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Density of High School GPA 
(among students who did not meet the ACT requirement) 
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Figure 5. Density of ACT scores (McCrary test) 
(among students who did not meet the GPA requirement) 
 
 
Figure 6. Density of High School GPA (McCrary test) 
(among students who did not meet the ACT requirement) 
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Table 4. McCrary Test Results 
Running variables Discontinuity Height Std. Error t-value 
ACT score 0.523 0.074 7.068*** 
High school GPA 0.915 0.116 7.888*** 
 
Although passing the McCrary test is “neither necessary nor sufficient”(McCrary, 2008, p. 701) for 
causal interpretation, I cannot rule out the possibility that my estimates could be confounded by differences 
between scholarship recipients and non-recipients. The issue of student manipulation is difficult to avoid if the 
assignment rules are publicly known, and the treatment is beneficial for agents, such as merit-based aid 
(McCrary, 2008). Although the TELS bill was passed just a few months before students in my sample entered 
college (January, 2004), it was still possible for some of them to take the ACT exam multiple times until they 
passed the threshold. Therefore, the regression discontinuity estimates of my study could substantially reduce 
selection bias, but not entirely remove it.  
As a way to check if recipients are different from non-recipients, it is recommended that researchers 
create a plot of each of the covariates against a running variable, a so-called “balance test” (Imbens & Lemieux, 
2008; van der Klaauw, 2012). If the plot of a covariate is discontinuous at the cut-off point, it indicates that 
recipients are different from non-recipients in terms of that covariate. However, even if researchers found a 
balance between two groups, it would be still possible that the two groups are different in unobservable factors.  
Figures 7 and 8 show the plots against ACT scores and high school GPAs, respectively. The point zero 
on the x-axis indicates the cut-off scores. Assuming that students on both sides are quite similar, I expect to see 
that the plot does not suddenly jump or drop at the threshold. In Figure 7, I observe that the proportion of 
female students and that of the average high school GPA tend to be balanced around the threshold. However, 
the proportion of racial minority students and the proportion of Pell-eligible students decrease in a small step 
function. In terms of having a college-educated parent, the proportion increases continuously, but the slope is 
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rather steep. As a result, the proportion of students who have a college-educated parent seems quite different 
between recipients and non-recipients. Therefore, these three factors (racial minority, Pell Grants eligibility, and 
having a parent with college education) need to be controlled for in the discontinuity model.       
In Figure 8, each of the covariates tends to change continuously and be balanced on either side of the 
cut-off point, except for the proportion of female students. Compared to Figure 7, the sample is more balanced 
in Figure 8 where the assignment variable is high school grades. This might be explained by the narrow optimal 
bandwidth with a high school GPA as a forcing variable. In Figure 8, the proportion of female students 
suddenly increases right after the cut-off point. This suggests that female students who failed to meet the ACT 
requirement might try hard to make the GPA requirement.   
 
 
Figure 7. Discontinuity in covariates (ACT) 
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Figure 8. Discontinuity in covariates (GPA) 
 
Lastly, I explore whether there is a sudden jump in the probability of graduation right at the cut-off 
scores. If receiving scholarships increased the graduation probabilities, then it would be expected to see a 
sudden increase in the probabilities around the cut-off scores. In Figures 9 and 10, I plot the graduation 
probabilities against each of the running variables. Although the average graduation rate is much higher for 
recipients than non-recipients (55% for recipients as opposed to 25% for non-recipients), the graduation 
probability does not seem to jump at the cut-off score in both figures. Instead, the graduation probabilities seem 
to be higher on average among scholarship recipients (students on the right side of the cut-off scores) than non-
recipients (students on the left side).  
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Figure 9. Graduation probability as a function of ACT scores 
(among students who did not meet the GPA requirement) 	  	  
	  	  
Figure 10. Graduation probability as a function of high school GPA 
(among students who did not meet the ACT requirement) 
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From now on, I present my regression discontinuity estimates using simple mean differences and fuzzy 
regression discontinuity models. In Table 5, I compare the average rate of earning a bachelor’s degree anytime 
within six years between scholarship recipients and non-recipients within a set of bandwidths. Regardless of 
forcing variables and bandwidths used, the graduation rates are always higher for recipients than non-recipients. 
For example, scholarship recipients who scored between 19 and 20 on the ACT exam were 6.3% more likely to 
earn a bachelor’s degree within six years compared to non-recipients who scored between 17 and 18 on the 
exam. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant except for the 50% bandwidth around 
the ACT threshold. Similarly, the average degree attainment rates are always higher for scholarship recipients 
than non-recipients when the forcing variable is high school GPAs. The difference is statistically significant in 
all bandwidths.  
 
Table 5. Simple Mean Difference Between Recipients and Non-Recipients (Graduation) 
Bandwidths Recipients Non-Recipients Mean diff. t-value df 
Assignment variable: ACT scores 
100 % 
(2 points) 
0.311 
(0.011) 
0.249 
(0.016) 
0.063 3.079** 2,400 
50% 
(1 point) 
0.302 
(0.013) 
0.266 
(0.022) 
0.036 1.385 1,624 
200% 
(4 points) 
0.319 
(0.010) 
0.237 
(0.013) 
0.082 4.869*** 3,405 
Assignment variable: High School GPAs 
100 % 
(0.07 GPA) 
0.365 
(0.034) 
0.238 
(0.048) 
0.128 2.064* 275 
50% 
(0.03 GPA) 
0.427 
(0.047) 
0.2 
(0.074) 
0.227 2.301* 138 
200% 
(0.14 GPA) 
0.359 
(0.027) 
0.269 
(0.037) 
0.090 1.922+ 463 
Note: standard error in parentheses. p-value: *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
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Although the graduation rates are always higher for scholarship recipients, most estimates become 
statistically not significant in the full regression discontinuity models as shown in Table 6. When I use the ACT 
score as a forcing variable, scholarship recipients are still more likely to earn their degree within six years than 
non-recipients. However, the positive estimates are marginally significant only in the 200% bandwidth. These 
results suggest that the positive outcomes observed in Table 5 are largely attributable to observable differences 
between recipients and non-recipients. Among covariates, being female, being ineligible for Pell Grants (which 
indicates being financially better-off), having a college-educated parent, and having a higher high school GPA 
are positively associated with graduation.    
 
Table 6. Regression Discontinuity Estimates (ACT scores, Graduation) 
Bandwidth 100% 
(2 ACT) 
50% 
(1 ACT) 
200% 
(4 ACT) 
Received TELS 0	  .038 
(0.028) 
0	  .041 
(0.036) 
0.046+ 
(0.024) 
Female 0.035+ 
(0.019) 
0.046+ 
(0.023) 
0.056** 
(0.016) 
Racial Minority -0.006  
(0.024) 
-0.013  
(0.028) 
-0.024 
(0.020) 
Pell Grants Eligible -0.082*** 
(0.021) 
-0.081** 
(0.025) 
-0.078*** 
(0.017) 
Parental Education 0.061** 
(0.020) 
0.040 
(0.024) 
0.049** 
(0.017) 
High School GPA 0.153*** 
(0.037) 
0	  .138** 
(0.046) 
0.152*** 
(0.029) 
Institution Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 2,199 1,498 3,132 
Note: p-value: +: <0.10, *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
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In Table 7, I break down the graduation variable depending on the duration taken to earn a bachelor’s 
degree in the fourth, fifth, or sixth year only. Because the scholarships are renewable up to five years or 120 
college credits, whichever comes first, it may have incentivized students to finish their education within five 
years. According to Table 7, receiving the scholarships significantly increases the probability of graduating in 
the fourth year only. The estimates are positive, statistically significant, and robust across different bandwidths. 
However, receiving the scholarships does not have a significant impact on graduating in the fifth or sixth year. 
To summarize, receiving TELS does not change whether or not students earn a bachelor’s degree within six 
years. Instead, it significantly increases the probability of earning a bachelor’s degree in the fourth year.   
 
Table 7. Regression Discontinuity Estimates (ACT Scores, graduation in a given year) 
Bandwidth 100% 50% 200% 
Fourth-year Graduation 0.039* 
(0.019) 
0.051** 
(0.019) 
0.044** 
(0.014) 
Fifth-year Graduation -0.018 
(0.022) 
-0.020  
(0.029) 
-0.010 
(0.019) 
Sixth-year Graduation 0.017 
(0.016) 
0.011 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
Note: p-value: +: <0.10, *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
 
Tables 8 and 9 present fuzzy discontinuity estimates when a forcing variable is high school GPAs. 
Similar to the previous results, receiving TELS does not affect whether student earn a bachelor’s degree 
anytime within six years. According to Table 8, the estimates on the TELS variable are all positive, but none of 
them is statistically significant at the conventional level. In Table 8, the only factor that has a significant effect 
on graduation is being racial minority. Even when I break down the outcome variable into graduation in the 
fourth year, fifth year, and sixth year as in Table 9, receiving the scholarships does not have a significant impact 
on any of these outcomes in all bandwidths. 
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It is noteworthy that the results are sensitive to assignment variables used. Receiving TELS increases the 
probability of graduating in the fourth year in the first model (ACT scores as an assignment variable), while it 
does not in the second model (GPAs as an assignment variable). This is partially because the bandwidth is 
smaller for the second model, as of 0.07 point. Due to the narrow bandwidth, the sample size used in the second 
model is fewer, which leads to large standard errors.  
 
Table 8. Regression Discontinuity Estimates (High School GPA, Graduation) 
Bandwidth 100% 
(0.07 GPA) 
50% 
(0.03 GPA) 
200% 
(0.14 GPA) 
Received TELS 0.089 
(0.130) 
0.191 
(0.284) 
0.061 
(0.082) 
Female 0.060 
(0.064) 
0.020 
(0.095) 
0.087+ 
(0.048) 
Racial Minority -0.158* 
(0.080) 
-0.104 
(0.116) 
-0.154** 
(0.059) 
Pell Grants Eligible -0.073 
(0.066) 
-0.205+ 
(0.108) 
-0.071 
(0.050) 
Parental Education -0.022 
(0.062) 
0.027 
(0.093) 
-0.001 
(0.046) 
ACT Scores 0.005 
(0.026) 
-0.020 
(0.037) 
0.004 
(0.019) 
Institution Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 257 130 432 
Note: p-value: +: <0.10, *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
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Table 9. Regression Discontinuity Estimates (High School GPA, Graduation in a given year) 
Bandwidth 100% 50% 200% 
Fourth-year Graduation 0.006 
(0.070) 
0.087 
(0.154) 
-0.236 
(0.046) 
Fifth-year Graduation -0.047  
(0.102) 
-0.139 
(0.233) 
-0.016 
(0.064) 
Sixth-year Graduation 0.131 
(0.086) 
0.243 
(0.217) 
0.101+ 
(0.053) 
Note: p-value: +: <0.10, *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
 
Conclusion 
This study examines whether receiving Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarships has an influence on 
the probability of earning a bachelor’s degree within six years as well as earning a bachelor’s degree in the 
fourth, fifth, or sixth year. In Tennessee, state residents who immediately went to in-state colleges after high 
school graduation were eligible for the scholarships if they met either the ACT or high school GPA 
requirement. Because the ACT/GPA cut-off scores are rather arbitrary, I employ the regression discontinuity 
method that assumes students near the cut-off scores are almost identical except for whether they are eligible for 
merit-based aid. I find that receiving TELS does not significantly affect whether students earn a bachelor’s 
degree anytime within six years. Instead, receiving the scholarships significantly increases the probability of 
students earning their degree in the fourth year after they enter college. I draw several conclusions, especially 
based on the results from regression discontinuity models.  
First, receiving Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarships increases the probability of earning a 
bachelor’s degree in the fourth year, but not in other years. This can be explained in two ways which are 
somewhat contrary to each other. One way to explain this result is that the scholarships have a net positive 
effect on degree attainment; however, as many students fail to renew their scholarship eligibility, they do not 
fully benefit from the aid. Consistent with the human capital theory, TELS reduces direct costs of college 
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education and mitigates the financial burden of students. This may allow students to spend more time in 
academic and extracurricular activities on campus, which in turn leads to persistence and degree attainment. It is 
also possible that the renewal requirement, maintaining a 3.0 college GPA, gives its recipients an incentive to 
work hard in class. If this were true, TELS would provide students with monetary incentive to keep on track to 
earn a college degree. As Scott-Clayton (2011) observes in the case of West Virginia, merit-based aid has both 
financial and academic components that help students persist and graduate.   
Considering that the regression discontinuity estimates in this study are intent-to-treat estimates, the 
actual effect of TELS could be larger than the estimates. As mentioned previously, approximately 50% of 
scholarship recipients lost their scholarships after a couple of years because they failed to meet the renewal 
requirement. Supposing that receiving the scholarships have a positive impact on degree attainment, if all 
recipients in my sample had maintained their scholarships, then their graduation outcomes might have been 
largely improved (Henry, Rubenstein, & Bugler, 2004). 
Another way to explain the result is that there could be confounding factors that affect both receiving the 
scholarships and degree attainment. Although I find a positive impact of the scholarships on degree attainment, 
it is not yet conclusive whether TELS is the sole factor. Above all, results from the McCrary test and the 
balanced test suggest that scholarship recipients are different from non-recipients to some extent. The difference 
between the two groups might have affected the graduation outcomes in my study. For example, scholarship 
recipients were more likely to graduate in the fourth year than non-recipients not only because they received the 
scholarships but also because they were more motivated in the first place. Although my regression discontinuity 
estimates substantially reduce the difference between the two groups by limiting my sample to students near the 
cut-off scores and including several covariates, the difference is not entirely removed.   
At this point, there is not enough evidence to determine which explanation fits my results better. More 
importantly, both explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible that scholarship recipients 
were more likely to graduate than non-recipients in the first place, and then providing recipients with the 
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scholarships helped them attain their degree faster compared to non-recipients. Future research needs to employ 
a research design that disentangles the net impact of financial aid.    
Second, I find that the number of students who barely made the eligibility requirements is much higher 
than the number of students who barely missed them. This suggests that some students might have tried hard to 
satisfy the requirements by taking the ACT exam multiple times or pushing for better grades. This is not 
surprising given that manipulation is plausible when the treatment (merit-based aid in this case) is beneficial for 
agents, its assignment rules are widely known to the public, and agents have control over the assignment rules 
to some extent (McCrary, 2008). Although students in my sample had only a few months before entering 
college, some students still seemed to work through meeting the requirements and receive the scholarships. As 
van der Klaauw (2008) points out, there can be factors other than the treatment that incentivize students to make 
the cut-off scores. For example, students might need to have a 3.0 high school GPA not only for being eligible 
for TELS but also for getting accepted to selective colleges. Whatever the reason is, it is still plausible that these 
students who just made the cut-off scores are more motivated and persistent than students who failed to do so.  
Researchers have developed several strategies to deal with potential manipulation. Acknowledging the 
possibility of manipulation among students who took the SAT multiple times, Zhang et al., (2013) focus on 
SAT scores from the first attempt of each student. Cohodes and Goodman (2013) use the regression 
discontinuity method in the case of Massachusetts, where the state’s merit-based aid is awarded to students 
whose state exam scores put them on the 75th percentile or higher within their district. The authors argue that it 
is impossible for students to game the system because scholarship eligibility in Massachusetts is determined in 
relative terms after students take the test. Lastly, Castelman (2013) uses the difference-in-differences method 
because he is aware of the manipulation problem in his data. Because my data lack information about the 
frequency of tests taken by students or about previous cohorts, I leave this issue of manipulation as a limitation 
of this study.   
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Lastly, given the evidence of possible student manipulation, TELS appears to incentivize high school 
students to earn a better grade or a higher test score at least up to the point where they can secure the aid. This is 
consistent with previous studies which show that the average SAT/ACT scores of high school students have 
significantly gone up after a state adopted merit-based aid (Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar, 2006; Henry & 
Rubenstein, 2002; Pallais, 2009). The improvement in standardized test scores is encouraging, especially if the 
test scores accurately reflect student ability. However, it is also possible that students merely take advantage of 
the system by taking the tests multiple times, and the improved test scores do not translate into better outcomes 
in college. If this were the case, students’ money and effort spent on improving their test scores would be 
socially inefficient.   
This study adds to the existing literature by demonstrating the impact of receiving merit-based aid on 
degree attainment in Tennessee. This study significantly reduces selection bias by employing the regression 
discontinuity method. Results from this study show that receiving merit-based aid promotes degree attainment 
in the fourth year, even though a substantial number of scholarship recipients lose their scholarships a couple of 
years later.  
There are some recommendations for future research. First, future research that uses the regression 
discontinuity method to analyze the effect of merit-based aid needs to address potential manipulation issue. This 
issue would be plausible in many states given that eligibility requirements of most merit-based aid programs are 
publicly known and controllable by students. Future research that adequately addresses this issue will provide 
more precise evidence regarding whether merit-based aid affects graduation. Second, future research needs to 
consider how receiving merit-based aid in the first year affects a student’s college pathway to a degree. 
Recently, researchers have recognized that merit-based aid could affect college choice and examined how 
college choices affect graduation (Cohodes & Goodman, 2013; Castleman, 2013). In addition to these efforts, I 
also recommend examining whether receiving merit-based aid affects student enrollment patterns, year-to-year 
persistence, or transfer, all of which are related to their degree attainment.     
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Appendix B 
Table. B.1. Logistic Regression Results (in Odds-Ratio) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
TELS 3.569*** 
(3.184, 4.001) 
3.159*** 
(2.812, 3.548) 
3.390*** 
(2.928, 3.924) 
1.906*** 
(1.623, 2.239) 
1.905*** 
(1.620, 2.240) 
Female  1.368*** 
(1.278, 1.465) 
1.440*** 
(1.342, 1.546) 
1.266*** 
(1.174, 1.366) 
1.310*** 
(1.213, 1.414) 
Minority  0.553*** 
(0.507, 0.602) 
0.649*** 
(0.592, 0.711) 
0.897* 
(0.812, 0.991) 
0.881* 
(0.793, 0.980) 
Pell Eligible   0.571*** 
(0.527, 0.618) 
0.592*** 
(0.545, 0.644) 
0.592*** 
(0.544, 0.643) 
Parental 
Education 
  1.439*** 
(1.332, 1.554) 
1.394*** 
(1.286, 1.510) 
1.359*** 
(1.253, 1.474) 
HS GPA    2.928*** 
(2.696, 3.179) 
2.842*** 
(2.615, 3.089) 
ACT Score    1.047*** 
(1.035, 1.059) 
1.040*** 
(1.028, 1.053) 
Institution 
Dummy 
No No No No Yes 
Note: p-value: *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
Note: 95% Confidence Intervals are reported in parentheses.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Effect of Losing Scholarships on Persistence and Degree Attainment 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the effect of losing Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarships on college 
persistence and degree attainment. In Tennessee, approximately 50% of students who receive their state merit-
based aid lose it after their first year. In order to see whether losing the scholarships affects student success, I 
use the event history model and compare the hazard of re-enrolling and earning a bachelor’s degree within six 
years across scholarship keepers, losers, and non-recipients. Results show that students who maintained their 
scholarships were much more likely to re-enroll and graduate from college than the other two groups. However, 
scholarship losers were slightly more likely to re-enroll and graduate than non-recipients for a limited time. 
Results from this study suggest that merit-based aid has a positive effect on persistence and degree attainment 
only when students maintain their scholarships until graduation.        
 
Key words: merit-based aid, scholarship loss, persistence, degree attainment 
 
Introduction 
During the last three decades, a growing number of students entered college. The percentage of students 
who attended college within 12 months of their high school graduation increased from 49.3% in 1980 to 68.2% 
in 2011 (NCES, 2012).27 However, college graduation rates never exceeded 60%. Of first-time freshmen 
students who entered four-year colleges in 2005, only 38.6% and 58.3% earned their bachelors’ degrees within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 NCES (2012). Digest of Education.  
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four years and six years, respectively. When we look at two-year colleges, the percentage of students who 
earned a credential within 150% of the normal duration is even lower, as low as 30%.   
Why are we losing so many students on their way to degree? Traditionally, researchers explain that 
students drop out of college because they are not academically prepared, not academically or socially engaged 
in their institutions, or cannot afford college prices (Melguizo, 2011). The interaction between student and 
institutional factors makes the matter more complicated. According to Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2009), 
the low graduation rate can be attributed to the interaction between student and college factors because a large 
number of academically underprepared students are concentrated in less selective colleges where resources to 
help these students are scarce. There have been many policies and programs that are intended to help students 
stay in college and earn their degrees. Among them, financial aid may be the most direct and short-term 
intervention that gives students an incentive to postpone their labor market participation and pursue college 
education.  
Whether financial aid promotes persistence and graduation has been assessed in many studies. Most of 
the previous studies ask whether receiving financial aid (or being eligible for financial aid) affects a student’s 
college success (e.g., Alon, 2007; 2011, Bettinger, 2010; Chen & DesJardins, 2008; DesJardins, Ahlburg, & 
McCall, 2002; Goldrick-Rab, Harris, Benson, & Kelchen, 2011). Although these studies provide important 
insights regarding whether and how financial aid works, they have not reached a consensus about whether 
financial aid promotes college success. In addition, most of the previous studies focus on the effects of 
receiving need-based grants at one time period on student success later. However, Alon (2011) and Chen and 
DesJardins (2008) demonstrate that the effect of financial aid can be different depending on aid type, student 
income, and time period. Compared to need-based grants, merit-based aid serves different student population 
(generally more affluent and academically prepared students), and students must renew their scholarship 
eligibility every year. These characteristics suggest that merit-based aid might have a different impact on 
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student success compared to need-based aid. In this study, I examine whether merit-based aid promotes 
persistence28 and graduation, especially as a result of a year-to-year change in scholarship renewal status.    
Since the early 1990s, more than a dozen states have introduced merit-based aid whose eligibility is 
solely determined by a student’s test score and GPA (Dynarski, 2002). A unique feature of this type of aid is 
that students must renew their eligibility by maintaining their cumulative GPA above a certain point. If students 
fail to meet the standard, they lose the aid. Previous studies demonstrate that this risk of losing financial aid is 
real to many students, and students employ a variety of strategies not to lose it (Zhang et al., 2006). Despite 
their efforts, if they lose their aid in college, what happens to these students? Are they more likely to drop out of 
college than students who retain their aid because they cannot pay tuitions? Despite the financial hardship, do 
they still perform better than students who never receive the aid in the first place because they already finish at 
least one year of education?  
In this study, I answer these questions in the case of Tennessee. Tennessee implemented its state-funded 
merit-based aid in the fall of 2004. I divide the fall 2004 first-time freshman cohort enrolled in public four-year 
colleges into the three groups of scholarship keepers, scholarship losers, and non-recipients based on their 
scholarship receipt status. Then, I compare their probabilities of persistence and graduation up to six years after 
their initial enrollment using the event history model and the regression discontinuity method. I find that 
students who received and maintained merit-based aid were more likely to persist and graduate. However, these 
positive effects on scholarship keepers are not observed when I focus on students who met or missed renewal 
eligibility by a slight margin. Overall, students who lost their scholarships tended to persist and graduate at a 
higher rate than non-recipients for a limited time period.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In this study, I measure student persistence in terms of stop-out. Stop-out occurs when a student stops enrolling in any of the public 
four-year colleges in Tennessee for the first time. Regarding the definition, it is necessary to make sure that these students who once 
stop out can return to one of these institutions later after a couple of semesters. For example, some students who lose their scholarships 
and stop attending college might come back to their college after they earn sufficient money to pay their tuition. Or, it is also possible 
that students who lose their scholarships transfer to community colleges, which are usually more affordable to attend. In either case, 
these students are coded as stop-out. This operationalization of stop-out might have made the stop-out problem in this study look 
worse than it actually is.   
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This study analyzes the impact of losing merit-based aid on student outcomes such as persistence and 
graduation. In contrast to abundant evidence on receiving a scholarship, the effect of losing a scholarship has 
been rarely examined in the literature. Because a large number of students lose their scholarships each year, it is 
important to look at how losing scholarships affects these students and consider possible policy tools to help 
them. In addition, this study reflects the temporal element of scholarship renewal status, persistence, and 
graduation by employing an event history model. In other words, my study not only examines whether losing 
scholarships affects student success but also considers the effect of the timing of losing scholarships on student 
success. 
   
Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarships 
Tennessee adopted its merit-based aid program, Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarships (TELS) in 
2004. It consists of five sub-programs, each of which has a different award amount and eligibility. Of the five 
programs, the Wilder-Naifeh program is available only for students enrolled in one of the Tennessee 
Technological Centers. The other four programs are available for state residents who are enrolled at least part-
time in one of the state’s public and private colleges. To be eligible, students must have at least a 21 ACT score 
or a 3.0 high school GPA. An additional $1,000 to $1,500 is awarded for either highest-achieving students with 
a 27 ACT score and a 3.75 GPA or students whose family income is below $36,000, respectively.29  
Once students receive one of the scholarships, they must renew eligibility periodically by maintaining a 
3.0 cumulative GPA. 30 These check points come up when students attempted 24, 48, 72, 96, and 120 college 
credits including credits from remediation courses. For example, full-time students typically face their first 
checkpoint at the end of their second semester. If their cumulative GPA is at or above 3.0 at that time, they 
maintain their scholarships. If the GPA is below 3.0, they lose the scholarships in the next regular semester. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 When students in my sample entered college, the initial requirement was either a 19 on the ACT exam or a 3.0 high school GPA. 
The additional amount for low-achieving students was $1,000 at the time.  
30 Since 2008, the renewal threshold has been lowered to a 2.75 for students who attempt 24 and 48 credits. The 3.0 cumulative GPA 
is still required for students who attempt 72, 96, and 120 credits. Because my study uses the fall 2004 cohort, who went through the 
first and second checkpoints before 2008, I use the 3.0 GPA standard for all check points analyzed in this study.    
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Students who lose their scholarships can regain eligibility one time if their cumulative GPA at the next 
checkpoint is at or above 3.0.31 However, there are only a few students who have actually regained their 
financial aid.32   
According to the state’s annual report, approximately 50% of the fall 2004 cohort who received the 
scholarships maintained them at the end of their first year (THEC, 2009). After the second year, only 37% of 
initial recipients kept their scholarships. These renewal rates suggest that a majority of TELS recipients lost 
their scholarships within two years. The renewal rates differ based on which initial eligibility criterion students 
have satisfied. For example, the renewal rate is the highest for students who met both ACT and high school 
GPA criteria. In contrast, students who met either one of the criteria had much lower renewal rates. These 
statistics suggest that a majority of scholarship recipients lost their aid. In addition, it appears that whether 
students lost their scholarships is related to their academic performances prior to college attendance (e.g., ACT 
scores and high school GPAs) to some extent.   
 
Conceptual Framework 
To date, there has not been much work that theoretically explains the effect of losing a scholarship. 
Therefore, I make several propositions based on the human capital theory, which is widely used as a theoretical 
background for financial aid research. Although hypotheses of my study are built upon the human capital 
theory, results from my study should not be used as either supporting or opposing evidence of the theory.      
Based on economic theory, the human capital theory assumes that students are rational actors who 
pursue maximizing their utility among different sets of choices such as whether or not to go to college. In other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 To my knowledge, this is the only way for students who lose their scholarships due to the GPA requirement to regain their 
eligibility. According to the THEC website, students who lose their scholarships can appeal to either their institutional board or to the 
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation review panel only if they lose their scholarships for non-academic reasons (e.g., leaving an 
institution for personal or medical reasons; changing their enrollment status from full-time to part-time in the middle of a semester, 
etc.). The web site explicitly mentions that neither a student’s institution nor the TSAC panel “have the authority to rule on appeal 
from students due to a final high school GPA below the minimum required for initial eligibility or a lottery scholarship college GPA 
below the minimum required for continuation”. For more information regarding appeal process, visit 
https://www.tn.gov/CollegePays/mon_college/tels_appeals_exception.html.    
32 This statement is based on my personal communication with a former THEC staff. 
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words, students consider benefits and costs of each alternative and choose the one that satisfies them the most. 
Although utility includes both monetary and non-monetary values, most research using the human capital 
framework focuses on monetary benefits and costs of college education. This calculation can be simplified as 
equation (1).  
 
                                                                                                                        (1) 
 
Equation (1) illustrates future earnings and costs associated with college education. When a student has s 
years of college education, this generates direct and indirect costs of college education, . Direct costs include 
tuition, fees, and living expenses, while indirect costs mean a student’s foregone earnings, which (s)he would 
have earned if (s)he had a job right after graduating from high school. After s years of college education, (s)he 
expects annual earnings of  until (s)he retires in year t. Because both benefits and costs of college education 
occur in the future, both of them are discounted at a rate of i, which is equivalent to an interest rate. The human 
capital theory assumes that students can borrow money at a rate of i from the market to invest in their education 
(Schultz, 1961).  
When students decide whether to pursue another year of college education, they weigh the present value 
of the benefits to the present value of costs associated with another year of education. Then, students decide to 
attend another year of college only if the benefits are larger than the costs. In this study, receiving merit-based 
aid will increase the estimate of equation (1) by reducing direct costs of college education ( ). When other 
things are held constant, I hypothesize that receiving merit-based aid will encourage students to attend another 
year of college, which subsequently leads them to earn a bachelor’s degree. In contrast, losing merit-based aid 
will decrease the estimate of equation (1) by increasing the portion of direct costs of education ( ) that 
students have to pay out of their pocket. When other things are held constant, I hypothesize that students who 
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lose their scholarships will have a lower probability of re-enrolling in college, which also leads to a lower 
probability of earning a bachelor’s degree.   
 
Literature Review 
There is not a large literature that explains how losing a scholarship affects persistence and graduation. 
Instead, several researchers demonstrate that students strategically choose courses and majors so that they can 
maintain good grades and keep their scholarships. Because students must maintain a certain GPA, they avoid 
difficult courses and take fewer credits per semester. In particular, these strategic behaviors are frequently 
observed among students who major in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Dee and Jackson 
(1999) find that students who entered Georgia Tech in 1996 were more likely to lose their HOPE scholarship if 
they majored in science, computer science, and engineering compared to their peers in humanities and social 
science majors, even after taking into account their SAT scores.  
In a similar vein, Zhang et al., (2006) and Mobley, Brawner, and Ohland (2009) illustrate enrollment 
behaviors of merit-based aid recipients in the case of Florida and South Carolina, respectively. These authors 
find that scholarship recipients tended to take fewer credits per semester, enroll in summer or leisure courses, 
leave their majors, withdraw from classes in which they anticipated to earn low grades, and re-take a course if 
they actually received low grades. In Georgia, Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) observe similar behaviors 
most frequently among students whose GPAs were at the margin of the renewal threshold. These studies show 
that scholarship recipients are concerned about the risk of losing their scholarships and change their behavior to 
avoid the possibility. Despite the evidence, only a few studies investigate the effects of losing merit-based aid 
on college outcomes.  
Henry, Rubenstein, and Bugler (2004) compare college outcomes among three groups: students who 
received and maintained the HOPE scholarships, students who initially received but lost the scholarships, and 
students who did not receive the scholarships in the first place. In order to minimize selection bias, they limit 
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their sample to students whose high school GPA was close to the cut-off GPA. They also match recipients with 
non-recipients based on students’ GPAs and institutions. The authors find that scholarship recipients earned 
more cumulative credits and had higher college GPAs than non-recipients. However, even with the same 
number of credits earned and GPAs, scholarship recipients who lost their scholarships were not more likely to 
graduate within four years than scholarship non-recipients, while scholarship recipients who maintained their 
scholarships were more likely to graduate than non-recipients. This is one of the few studies that demonstrate 
that losing merit-based aid decreases graduation probabilities. However, the authors do not explain why the 
graduation outcome differs between scholarship keepers and losers, especially when their credits earned and 
grades are equivalent.   
Other than Henry, Rubenstein, and Bugler (2004), little is known about the effect of losing a scholarship 
on persistence and graduation. Most studies that examine whether receiving merit-based aid affects degree 
attainment tend to focus on the difference between scholarship recipients and non-recipients, not paying much 
attention to scholarship losers. In her regression discontinuity model, Scott-Clayton (2011) defines both 
scholarship keepers and losers as scholarship recipients and compares college outcomes between the two groups. 
Similarly, researchers using the difference-in-differences method have not considered whether individual 
students lost their scholarships (Dynarski, 2005; Zhang, 2011). Instead, they focus on the before- and after-
merit-aid-policy difference in the average graduation rates between states with and without merit-based aid. 
Given that all three previous studies find significant and positive effects of (receiving) merit-based aid on 
degree attainment in several states, receiving merit-based aid seems to have a large positive effect on degree 
attainment, which is not canceled out by possible negative effects of losing scholarships. This study directly 
tests if the positive effect of receiving merit-based aid on degree attainment holds true by comparing persistence 
and graduation outcomes of scholarship losers to those of scholarship keepers and non-recipients.   
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Data & Sample 
In this study, I use administrative data that is collected and managed by the Tennessee Higher Education 
Commission (THEC). Every postsecondary education institution in Tennessee is required to send its student 
information to THEC. Of the data, I have access to students who entered one of the state’s public four-year 
colleges in 2004 fall. Then, I further limit my sample to students who met all of the initial eligibility 
requirements except for standardized test scores and high school grades so that I can minimize possible 
selection bias.33 As a result, my sample consists of first-time freshman students who enrolled at least part-time 
in one of the state’s public four-year colleges. The data allows me to track these students as long as they remain 
in one of the state’s public four-year colleges.  
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of my sample. Female students are more represented than male 
students. In terms of race and ethnicity, white or Asian students make up 79% of the sample, while African-
American, Hispanic, American Indian, and multi-racial students are 21% of the sample. Approximately 65% of 
the sample has at least one college-educated parent. Approximately 33% of students were eligible for Pell 
Grants, which is used as a proxy for low-income status in this study.34  
In my sample, 87% received one type of the TELS awards when they entered college, while 13% of 
students did not. The percentage of scholarship recipients is much higher than that among population because I 
exclude many students who did not satisfy basic eligibility requirements (e.g., state residency) from my sample. 
Of the 87% of students who initially received the scholarships, 52% of them lost their scholarships. Of all 
students in my sample, 58% of my sample has stopped out of their college at least once, while the remaining 
42% continuously enrolled in college until graduation. In terms of graduation, 47% of my sample earned their 
bachelor’s degree within six years.    
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 More specifically, I exclude students from my sample if they 1) were not the state residents at the time of college application 2) 
entered college after sixteen months of high school graduation or 3) enrolled fewer than 6 credits during their first semester.   
34 My data reports family income information, but the missing rate is as high as 43%. Therefore, I use the Pell-eligibility as a proxy for 
family income because it indicates the extent to family resources which can be used for a student’s college education.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Characteristics Categories Percentages 
Gender Male 45.34% 
 Female 54.66% 
Race White/Asian 78.90% 
 Racial minorities 21.10% 
Parental Education Some college 65.25% 
(At least one parent) No college 34.75% 
Pell Grants Eligibility Eligible 32.51% 
 Ineligible 67.49% 
TELS Status Keep 35.20% 
 Lose (ever) 51.76% 
 Never receive 13.04% 
Stop Out (ever) Yes 58.21% 
 No 41.79% 
BA Attainment (ever) Yes 47.46% 
 No 52.54% 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation 
ACT composite 22.384 3.944 
High School GPA 3.275 0.586 
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Methods 
This study examines two research questions. First, were students who lost their scholarships more likely 
to stop out than their peers who either maintained their scholarships or did not receive one at all? Second, were 
students who lost their scholarships more likely to earn a bachelor’s degree within six years than their peers 
who either maintained their scholarships or did not receive one at all? 
To answer these questions, I mainly use the event history model.  Event history models not only 
examine whether an event of interest occurs but also investigate how long it takes for the event to occur (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). More specifically, an event history model estimates the probability that a person 
experiences an event of interest at time t, conditional on that the person has not experienced it before. This is 
called a hazard function, . An event history model estimates the hazard function of an event of interest as 
well as how covariates affect the hazard function. For example, results from the event history model in my 
study will show the probability of stopping out at each semester as well as how the stop-out probability changes 
depending on covariates.  
In this study, I mainly use the Cox hazard model. The Cox model is preferred when a researcher does 
not have an assumption about the functional form of the baseline hazard (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, & 
Marchenko, 2010). Because I do not have a prior knowledge about the baseline hazard function of both 
outcomes (stop-out and graduation), I first employ the Cox model, as specified in equation (2).   
 
€ 
h(t | xit ) = h0(t)exp(xitB) = h0(t)exp(B1x1t + B2x2t + ...+ Bkxkt ) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2) 
 
The left side of equation (2) shows that this model estimates the hazard function of experiencing each of 
the events of interest (i.e., stop-out and graduation). In my study, the stop-out variable takes on the value of 1 
€ 
h(t)
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when a student stops enrolling in their college for the first time.35 If the student is enrolled, the stop-out variable 
has a value of 0. Another outcome variable of this study is whether a student earned his/her bachelor’s degree at 
time t. Again, the graduation variable takes on the value of 1 if a student earned a bachelor’s degree at time t, 
and 0 otherwise. I track students up until six years after they entered college because six-year graduation is a 
common benchmark to evaluate student success. Students who did not earn a bachelor’s degree and were still 
enrolled at the last semester of the sixth year are treated as right-censored cases.36  
The middle and right sides of equation (2) show that the model estimates the hazard function of first 
stop-out (or degree attainment) at time t conditional on covariates (
€ 
xit ). I leave the baseline hazard function (
€ 
h0(t)) unspecified because it is not necessary, when using the Cox model. Because the baseline hazard function 
is the same for students at the same time period, it is independent variables that determine different hazard 
functions across students. The key independent variables that I am interested in are indicators that show if 
students kept, lost, or never received the TELS award. In my model, the reference group is those who never 
received the scholarships in the first place. I compare these non-recipients to students who kept their 
scholarships until graduation and students who lost their scholarships in college. This way, I can see if receiving 
TELS and losing it later is any better than never receiving it. The model also allows me to examine if losing 
TELS is significantly worse than keeping the aid in terms of student persistence and graduation. In addition to 
these key independent variables, I include a student’s demographic characteristics, family background, and prior 
academic achievement in the model. Table 2 describes these independent and outcome variables used in my 
study.    
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 These students could have transferred to private or out-of-state colleges. Due to the data availability, I assume that these students 
have stopped enrolling in college.   
36 Right-censored cases are those who have not experienced an event of interest, but who still show up in data. It is possible that 
limiting the time period of my study to six years will lose some students who do eventually graduate. In my sample, there is only one 
student who enrolled more than six years and did eventually earn a bachelor’s degree.  
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Table 2. Description of Variables  
Categories Variables Description 
Outcome 
Variables 
Stop-out 1: if students stop being enrolled in the next regular semester (e.g., fall to 
spring, spring to fall) for the first time 
0: if students continuously enrolled 
 Graduation 1: if students earned a bachelor’s degree within 6 years 
0: otherwise 
Independent 
Variables 
TELS Two dummy variables, one of which indicates students who received and 
maintained TELS (scholarship keepers), and another indicates students who 
received and lost TELS (scholarship losers). The reference group is 
students who never received TELS in the first place.   
 Female 0: male, 1: female 
Control  Minority 0: white or Asian, 1: African-American, Hispanic, others 
Variables Pell 0: Pell grants ineligible, 1: Pell grants eligible 
 Parent College 0: Neither of parents has college experience 
1: At least one parent has enrolled at least one semester in college 
 GPA A student’s high school GPA (continuous) 
 ACT A student’s ACT composite score (continuous) 
 College 
Majors 
Two dummy variables that indicate whether students major in one of the 
STEM fields (stem) or have not decided their majors (undecided). 
The reference group is students in non-stem majors 
 
It is necessary to take into account institutional effects on persistence and graduation. As Pascarella and 
Terenzini (2005) conclude, institutional characteristics (e.g., institutional control, selectivity, etc.) are associated 
with these outcomes, even after student characteristics are controlled for. Students in my sample started at one 
of nine public four-year colleges in Tennessee,37 and students enrolled in the same college may share common 
culture and learning environments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 University of Memphis, Austin Peay State University, East Tennessee State University, Middle Tennessee State University, 
University of Tennessee at Knoxville, University of Tennessee at Martin, Tennessee State University, Tennessee Technological 
University, and University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.  
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In order to take into account within-college correlation, I try three different approaches: 1) cluster-robust 
standard error, 2) institutional fixed effects, and 3) stratified models (Cleves et al., 2010).38 The first approach 
fixes standard errors without changing the point estimates. The second approach directly estimates the effect of 
each institution, which will shift the baseline hazard line up or down. This approach is appropriate when a 
researcher is interested in the sample itself rather than making an inference about the population. The third 
approach estimates a separate baseline hazard for each of the colleges in the sample. This is contrasting to the 
second approach, which assumes that the shape of the baseline hazard is the same for different groups (colleges, 
in this study). When I run my model using these three approaches, results are qualitatively the same in most 
cases. Therefore, I report my results using the third approach and mention results from the other two estimates 
only if they are substantially different across the three approaches.    
Lastly, when using an event history model, the issue of “tied failures” is commonly observed. Because 
most data are measured in a discrete interval (e.g., days, months, years, etc.), it is possible that at least two 
subjects experience an event of interest at the same interval. For example, in my study, a substantial number of 
students did not come back (re-enroll in) their third semester (the fall semester of their sophomore year). Some 
of them might have stopped attending college in the middle of their second semester, while others have stopped 
out after completing the second semester. Because it is not possible to measure the exact date of their stop-out, 
there are several ways to handle these tied failure cases. Of these procedures, I use the efron approximation, 
which is not too computationally intensive but reflect the number of students who are at risk of experiencing an 
outcome more accurately than the breslow approximation (Cleves et al., 2010).  
In addition to the Cox model, I also run the Weibull and discrete-time models to see if my estimates are 
consistent across these models. The difference among these three models is the way each model assumes the 
baseline hazard function. The Weibull model assumes a monotonically increasing or decreasing baseline, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Another way to handle within-college correlation is to include institutional characteristic variables in my model. However, nine 
colleges in my sample are all public four-year colleges located in the same state, which means that they already share the same 
features in terms of institutional control, institutional type, and location. Hence, I choose to use more indirect ways of controlling for 
within-college correlation such as adjusting standard error or including institutional fixed effects.  
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the discrete-time model allows the baseline to differ at each semester. I look at these models as well for the 
following reasons. First, the Weibull model (or other parametric models) provides more efficient estimates if 
the model’s assumption is met. Second, the discrete-time analysis model is used because both of the outcome 
variables (stop-out and graduation) are measured at discrete intervals (Allison, 1982). Lastly, I use these two 
models as a sensitivity check because my data violates the proportional hazards assumption, which is critical for 
using the Cox model (Steele, 2005). According to the proportional hazards assumption, the effects of a 
covariate remain constant at all time periods. If the magnitude or direction of the effects varies over time, it 
indicates a violation of this assumption. Because my data, especially the key independent variables that indicate 
a student’s scholarship renewal status, violates the assumption, I use the discrete-time model, which “allows for 
non-proportional hazards” (Steele, 2005, p.8).   
An event history model addresses several challenges that traditional regression models face (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). First, an event history model accommodates a skewed distribution, which is 
often the case when an outcome variable is the duration of time for an event to happen. The model allows 
researchers to choose an appropriate functional form that fits the distribution of their outcome variable. Second, 
an event history model differentiates between missing and censored data. 39 An OLS model treats both cases as 
missing, which leads to biased estimates. Lastly, an event history model allows time-varying variables, while an 
OLS model does not. Because the key independent variables of this study (scholarship renewal status) can vary 
each semester, it is important to reflect the temporal element of the variables.   
Despite these advantages, an event history model is not very powerful in terms of reducing selection 
bias. That is, except for the factors controlled in the model, unobservable differences among scholarship 
keepers, losers, and non-recipients still remain. To complement the limitation, I run a regression discontinuity 
model at each of the five renewal checkpoints. In the regression discontinuity model, I compare scholarship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 There are two types of censored cases: right-censored and left-truncated. Right-censored cases are observed when an event of 
interest does not occur until the last period of observation. In this research, students who did not graduate from college within six 
years of initial enrollment and still enrolled in college can be an example of right-censored cases. Left-truncated cases are those who 
experienced the event of interest even before they were observed by researchers. Regardless of the type, censored cases are different 
from missing observations, so they need to be treated differently (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).     
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losers to scholarship keepers in terms of their stop-out and graduation, as specified in equation (3). In equation 
(3), 
€ 
Yi 	  represents whether or not a student ever stopped out (or earned a bachelor’s degree) within six years of 
their initial enrollment. The key independent variable is 
€ 
(loseit ) , which indicates whether or not a student lost 
his/her scholarship at checkpoint t. Once a student lost scholarship at a checkpoint, I exclude the student from 
analysis for subsequent checkpoints. In addition, I add my running variable 
€ 
(GPAit ) and a vector of covariates 
that are also included in the event history models above (as summarized in Table 2).40 Adding covariates in the 
model does not address biased estimates, but improves precision of my estimates.    
 
€ 
Yit = α + β1(GPAit ) +δ(loseit ) + φXit +ε it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3) 
 
Results 
Stop-Out 
In this section, I first present the results about stop-out, and then proceed to results about graduation. 
Table 3 and Figure 1 show how the hazard of experiencing first stop-out changes each semester (fall, spring, 
and summer). Because it is optional to enroll in a summer semester, a student is regarded re-enrolled (persisted) 
as long as he or she is enrolled in a regular semester (fall or spring). According to Table 3, a large number of 
students first stopped out after their first academic year. The fifth column of Table 3 shows the survivor 
function of students. The survivor function goes down to 91.07% and 76.44% after the first and second 
semester, respectively. That is, 23.56% of students stopped out during the first academic year. After the first 
academic year, the survivor function decreases at a slow rate. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1. In Figure 1, 
each of the red dashed vertical lines indicates the end of an academic year. As can be seen, the survivor function 
sharply drops at the first red line (at the end of the first academic year) and then gradually decreases.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In the regression discontinuity model, I also add two more terms: 1) the square term of the running variable and 2) the interaction 
term between the key independent variable and the running variable. The square term is added in case the relationship between the 
running variable and the outcome variable is quadratic. The interaction term allows the effect (slope) of the running variable differs 
for scholarship keepers and losers.  
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Table 3. Life Table of Students Experiencing First Stop-Out 
Semester Students 
at Risk 
Students 
Stopped 
Students 
Censored 
Survivor 
Function 
Std. Error 
2004 F 14,394 1,285 0 0.9107 0.0024 
2005 S 13,109 2,106 0 0.7644 0.0035 
2005 SU 11,003 71 1 0.7595 0.0036 
2005 F 10,931 881 0 0.6983 0.0038 
2006 S 10,050 942 1 0.6328 0.0040 
2006 SU 9,107 71 5 0.6279 0.0040 
2006 F 9,031 521 57 0.5917 0.0041 
2007 S 8,453 451 24 0.5601 0.0041 
2007 SU 7,978 46 218 0.5569 0.0041 
2007 F 7,714 284 2,338 0.5364 0.0042 
2008 S 5,092 261 494 0.5089 0.0043 
2008 SU 4,337 53 1,328 0.5027 0.0043 
2008 F 2,956 177 1,265 0.4726 0.0046 
2009 S 1,514 123 245 0.4342 0.0054 
2009 SU 1,146 24 344 0.4251 0.0056 
2009 F 778 74 254 0.3846 0.0067 
2010 S 450 0 450 0.3846 0.0067 
Note: F means fall, S means spring, and SU means summer.  	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Figure 1. Survivor Function of Student Stop-Out 	  
In Figure 2, I look at how the survivor function differs depending on scholarship renewal status. 
According to the figure, it seems clear that the probability of re-enrolling (persistence) is the highest among 
scholarship keepers, followed by scholarship losers and non-recipients. Except after the first semester, the 
survivor function is always the highest among students who maintained their scholarships.  
I confirm these trends with the statistical test. The equality test of survivor functions examines whether 
survivor functions among different groups are statistically same. Using the log-rank test, I find that the 
functions are significantly different across the three groups ( =1026.90, p-value=0.000). These results suggest 
that the scholarship renewal status is significantly associated with stop-out behavior.   
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Figure 2. Survivor Function of Student Stop-Out by Scholarship Status 
 
Although the survivor function and log-rank test results show that stop-out probabilities significantly 
differ based on scholarship renewal status, these results still reflect observable and unobservable differences 
among scholarship keepers, losers, and non-recipients. In order to take into account observable differences, I 
run event history models that include covariates. Table 4 shows estimates from these models.   
In the first column of Table 4, I present the estimates from the Cox model in terms of the hazard ratio.41 
In parentheses, I present the 95% confidence interval of hazard ratio estimates. In this model, I find that the 
hazard of stopping out is lower for both scholarship keepers and losers in comparison to non-recipients. 
Compared to non-recipients, the hazard of stop-out is 3% lower for scholarship losers and 14% lower for 
scholarship keepers. However, the difference is statistically significant only for scholarship keepers. In other 
words, the stop-out hazard is not statistically different between scholarship losers and non-recipients. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The hazard ratio can be calculated by taking exponential on a raw coefficient.  
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addition to the scholarship renewal status, racial minority students, students whose parent(s) has some college 
experience, and students with higher ACT scores or high school grades were less likely to stop out. In contrast, 
students who were eligible for Pell Grants, students who majored in one of the STEM fields, or students who 
have not decided their majors were more likely to stop out than students who were not eligible for Pell Grants 
and students in non-STEM majors. There is no gender difference in terms of stop-out behavior. The effects of 
these covariates are consistent in other models.  
In the second column of Table 4, I add interaction terms between scholarship renewal status and time 
periods in addition to model 1. As previously mentioned, my data does not pass the proportional hazards 
assumption test. This suggests that the effects of independent variables are not constant over time. By adding 
the interaction terms between key independent variables and time period, I could see whether and how the 
effects of key independent variables change over time. 
In case of scholarship losers, the hazard of stopping out is lower than that of non-recipients in the 
beginning. The main coefficient for scholarship losers is 0.738 in the form of hazard ratio. However, when I 
consider coefficients on the main and interaction terms, the hazard for scholarship losers gradually increases. As 
a result, the hazard of stopping out for scholarship losers becomes higher than that for non-recipients since the 
sixth semester. In other words, losing TELS can have worse consequences even compared to never receiving it 
after a few semesters. Figure 3 illustrates how the hazard of stopping out changes over time in comparison to 
non-recipients (the red horizontal line).   
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Table 4. Event History Model Estimates (Outcome: Stop-Out) 
Variables Model (1) 
Cox  
Model (2) 
Cox with interaction 
Model (3) 
Weibull 
Model (4) 
Discrete-time 
Lose 0.972 
(0.903, 1.046) 
0.738*** 
(0.659, 0.828) 
0.893** 
(0.830, 0.962) 
0.544*** 
(0.475, 0.622) 
Keep 0.860** 
(0.784, 0.944) 
1.345***  
(1.176, 1.538) 
0.787*** 
(0.717, 0.865) 
1.277** 
(1.097, 1.485) 
Female 1.001 
(0.944, 1.061) 
1.000 
(0.943, 1.060) 
1.011 
(0.953, 1.072) 
0.895** 
(0.837, 0.957) 
Minority 0.919* 
(0.852, 0.991) 
0.911* 
(0.845, 0.982) 
0.909* 
(0.843, 0.979) 
0.889** 
(0.815, 0.969) 
Pell eligibility 1.276*** 
(1.200, 1.357) 
1.271*** 
(1.195, 1.351) 
1.260*** 
(1.185, 1.339) 
1.379*** 
(1.285, 1.480) 
Parent College 
 
0.890*** 
(0.839, 0.944) 
0.890*** 
(0.839, .0944) 
0.886*** 
(0.835, 0.940) 
0.858*** 
(0.801, 0.917) 
High School GPA 0.525*** 
(0.492, 0.560) 
0.517*** 
(0.484, 0.551) 
0.522*** 
(0.490, 0.557) 
0.506*** 
(0.470, 0.545) 
ACT score 0.970*** 
(0.960, 0.979) 
0.970*** 
(0.960, 0.979) 
0.973*** 
(0.964, 0.983) 
0.966*** 
(0.956, 0.977) 
STEM major 1.126** 
(1.034, 1.225) 
1.136** 
(1.045, 1.237) 
1.201*** 
(1.104, 1.307) 
1.067  
(0.970, 1.173) 
Undecided major 1.781*** 
(1.658, 1.913) 
1.772*** 
(1.650, 1.903) 
2.253*** 
(2.101, 2.417) 
1.767*** 
(1.627, 1.919) 
Lose*Time N/A 1.062*** 
(1.037, 1.087) 
N/A 1.097*** 
(1.069, 1.125) 
Keep*Time N/A 0.887*** 
(0.861, 0.915) 
N/A 0.891*** 
(0.863, 0.920) 
Number of students 12,626 12,626 12,626 73,402 
Institutional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Semester FE No No Yes Yes 
Note: hazard ratios (models 1, 2, and 3) or odds-ratio (model 4) as coefficients, 95% CI in parentheses.  
Note: p-value: +: <0.10, *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
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Figure 3. Probability of Stop-Out (Ref: Non-Recipients) 
 
In the third and fourth columns of Table 4, I present estimates from the Weibull and discrete-time 
analysis models, respectively. As can be seen, the results are qualitatively the same across different models. In 
the third column, I present the estimates from the Weibull model without the interaction terms. This model is 
equivalent to model (1) except that it has a different assumption about the baseline hazard. Without the 
interaction terms, the hazard of stopping out is lower for both scholarship losers and keepers compared to non-
recipients. When I estimate the discrete-time model without interaction terms (not presented in Table 4), the 
estimates are similar to the ones from models (1) and (3). When I include interaction terms in model 4, the 
results are consistent to the one from model (2). The hazard of stopping out for scholarship keepers is higher 
only for the first two semesters, and then becomes lower. In contrast, the hazard for scholarship losers is lower 
for the first six semesters, and then starts to be higher than non-recipients.  
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To summarize, after controlling for students’ demographic characteristics and academic preparation, 
scholarship keepers still face a lower hazard of stopping out compared to non-recipients at almost all time 
periods. This appears reasonable given that scholarship recipients were academically better prepared and had 
more monetary resources. However, scholarship losers face a higher hazard of stopping out than non-recipients 
after the first two to three years. Given that many students in the sample lost their scholarships within the first 
two years of their enrollment, this result may suggest that losing the scholarships have negative effects on 
student persistence after losing their aid.          
 
Graduation 
In this section, I present the effect of keeping, losing, or never receiving TELS on degree attainment 
within six years. Table 5 shows that a large number of students graduated from college in their senior year. In 
the fifth column of Table 5, the survivor function sharply decreases from 0.97 to 0.74 in Fall 2007 (the 
beginning of their senior year). It again suddenly drops from 0.53 to 0.38 in Fall 2008 (the beginning of their 
fifth year). In other words, more than one-half of the sample graduated within four years of their initial 
enrollment. However, about 23% of the sample neither graduated nor dropped out of college even after the six 
years. This pattern is also illustrated in Figure 4. In the figure, each of the red dashed vertical lines indicates the 
end of the third, fourth, and fifth academic year. As can be seen, very few students graduated up until the end of 
the ninth semester (their third year), and then the survivor function sharply decreases within the next year.   
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Table 5. Life Table of Students Experiencing Degree Attainment 
Semester Students at Risk Students 
Stopped 
Students 
Censored 
Survivor 
Function 
Std. Error 
2006 SU 10,952 3 49 0.9997 0.0002 
2006 F 10,900 54 363 0.9948 0.0007 
2007 S 10,483 22 376 0.9927 0.0008 
2007 SU 10,085 214 44 0.9716 0.0016 
2007 F 9,827 2352 322 0.7391 0.0044 
2008 S 7,153 507 317 0.6867 0.0046 
2008 SU 6,329 1408 65 0.5339 0.0051 
2008 F 4,856 1388 281 0.3813 0.0050 
2009 S 3,187 304 269 0.3449 0.0050 
2009 SU 2,614 453 69 0.2852 0.0048 
2009 F 2,092 408 265 0.2295 0.0046 
2010 S 1,419 0 1415 0.2295 0.0046 
Note: F means fall, S means spring, and SU means summer.  
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Figure 4. Survivor Function of Degree Attainment 
 
When I look at the survivor function based on scholarship renewal status, it is clear that students who 
received and kept TELS were the most likely to earn a bachelor’s degree within six years. Figure 5 shows that 
the survivor function is always lower for scholarship keepers than for the other two groups, which indicates that 
scholarship keepers were the most likely to graduate at every semester. Between students who lost the 
scholarships and students who never received one, the survivor function is always lower for those who lost the 
scholarships. In other words, in terms of the average graduation rates, the graduation rates are the highest for 
scholarship keepers and the lowest for non-recipients. However, again, the average rates do not take into 
account any differences among these groups. 
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Figure 5. Survivor Function of Degree Attainment by TELS Status 
 
Table 6 shows the estimates from event history models that include covariates. The first model in Table 
6 presents estimates from the Cox model without the interaction terms between key independent variables and 
time periods. This model indicates that scholarship keepers have a higher hazard of graduation by 91% than 
non-recipients do. The hazard for scholarship losers is 14% lower than that for non-recipients, and the 
difference between the two groups is marginally significant. In addition to the key variables, being female, 
being minority, and having a higher ACT score or high school grade increase the hazard of graduation, while 
being eligible for Pell Grants, majoring in STEM, or having not decided their majors significantly decrease the 
hazard. After demographic characteristics and academic performances are controlled for, parental education 
levels are not significantly associated with graduation.   
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Table 6. Event History Model Estimates (Outcome: Graduation) 
Variables Model (1) 
Cox 
Model (2) 
Cox with interaction 
Model (3) 
Weibull 
Model (4) 
Discrete-time 
Lose 0.856+ 
(0.727, 1.008) 
0.166*** 
(0.061, 0.452) 
0.925 
(0.787, 1.088) 
0.755*** 
(0.698, 0.816) 
Keep 1.905*** 
(1.601, 2.267) 
3.461* 
(1.263, 9.484) 
2.283*** 
(1.920, 2.714) 
2.743*** 
(2.509, 2.998) 
Female 1.330*** 
(1.229, 1.440) 
1.325*** 
(1.224, 1.433) 
1.312*** 
(1.213, 1.420) 
1.135*** 
(1.096, 1.176) 
Minority 1.102+ 
(0.992, 1.225) 
1.090 
(0.981, 1.211) 
1.074  
(0.967, 1.193) 
0.836*** 
(0.799, 0.874) 
Pell eligibility 0.375*** 
(0.340, 0.414) 
0.374*** 
(0.339, 0.413) 
0.247*** 
(0.224, 0.273) 
0.608*** 
(0.586, 0.631) 
Parental college 
 
1.018  
(0.937, 1.105) 
1.013  
(0.933, 1.100) 
1.024  
(0.943, 1.111) 
1.194*** 
(1.152, 1.238) 
High School GPA 1.458*** 
(1.334, 1.594) 
1.455*** 
(1.330, 1.590) 
1.495*** 
(1.368, 1.633) 
1.933*** 
(1.858, 2.010) 
ACT score 1.013* 
(1.000, 1.025) 
1.011+ 
(0.999, 1.024) 
1.009  
(0.996, 1.021) 
0.996 
(0.991, 1.002) 
STEM Majors 0.749*** 
(0.679, 0.826) 
0.749*** 
(0.679, 0.826) 
0.744*** 
(0.675, 0.821) 
0.667*** 
(0.637, 0.699) 
Undecided Majors 0.081*** 
(0.052, 0.124) 
0.081*** 
(0.052, 0.124) 
0.082*** 
(0.053, 0.126) 
0.454*** 
(0.434, 0.476) 
Lose*Time N/A 1.141** 
(1.052, 1.237) 
N/A 1.035*** 
(1.023,	  1.048) 
Keep*Time N/A 0.945 
(0.869, 1.027) 
N/A 1.035*** 
(1.021, 1.050) 
Number of students 12,861 12,861 12,861 82,956 
Institutional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Semester FE No No Yes Yes 
Note: hazard ratios (models 1, 2, and 3) or odds-ratio (model 4) as coefficients, 95% CI in parentheses.  
Note: p-value: +: <0.10, *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001 
 
In model 2, I add the interaction terms between scholarship renewal status and time periods. When 
including the interaction terms, scholarship keepers still have a higher hazard of graduation from the beginning. 
And, the coefficient on the interaction term between the scholarship keeper indicator and time periods is not 
statistically significant. That is, the effect of keeping the scholarships on graduation does not change over time. 
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In contrast, the effect of losing the scholarships increases over time. At the beginning, the hazard of graduation 
is much lower for scholarship losers than non-recipients. However, given that no one graduates within first two 
years, this coefficient alone is not meaningful. When considering the coefficient on the interaction term, the 
hazard of graduation for scholarship losers gradually increases, and then it becomes higher for scholarship 
losers from the spring semester of the fifth year.  
 
 
Figure 6. Probability of Graduation for Scholarship Losers (Ref: Non-Recipients) 
 
In models 3 and 4, I run the Weibull and discrete-time analysis models, respectively. These results are 
consistent to the results observed in models 1 and 2 in Table 6. The only difference is that there are a few more 
coefficients that become statistically significant in model 4. These significant results can be attributed to the 
operationalization of the outcome variable in model 4. While the outcome variable in models 1 and 3 is whether 
a student earned a bachelor’s degree in each semester (time-varying), the outcome variable in model 4 is time-
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
Pr
ob
(G
ra
du
at
ion
)
0 5 10 15 20
Semester
	   113	  
constant variable that indicates whether a student earned a bachelor’s degree anytime within six years. If we 
ignore the timing of graduation, a few more covariates are significantly associated with graduation. Other than 
this, my results are robust across different model specifications.   
 
Sensitivity Check 
Lastly, I run a regression discontinuity model as specified in equation (3) to see if my results are 
consistent across different model specifications. As mentioned earlier, an event history model does not control 
for unobservable differences among scholarship keepers, losers, and non-recipients. However, a regression 
discontinuity model is as good as a random experiment in terms of dealing with selection bias when its key 
assumptions are met.  
Unfortunately, regression discontinuity estimates in this study do not entirely remove selection bias 
although they substantially reduce it. In order to check if my data meets the key assumption of the regression 
discontinuity method, I run the McCrary test at each of five checkpoints. According to Figure 7, the McCrary 
test shows that the number of students who barely met the renewal requirement at their first check point (24 
credits attempted) is much higher than the number of students who barely missed it at that point. Although not 
presented, the McCrary test results are consistent for all five checkpoints. These results suggest that scholarship 
keepers who barely met the renewal requirement were somewhat different from scholarship losers who barely 
missed it. Students in the former group seemed to be more desperate and motivated to renew scholarship 
eligibility than students in the latter group. The possible difference between these two groups challenges the 
critical assumption of the regression discontinuity model. Despite this limitation, I present the estimates from 
the regression discontinuity model because they could reflect the net impact of losing merit-based aid more 
accurately by focusing on a more homogeneous group of students around the renewal threshold compared to 
estimates from the event history models.  
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Figure 7. McCrary Test Results (First Check Point) 
 
Table 7 shows results from the regression discontinuity model at each of the five checkpoints. In the 
table, I present only the coefficient on the key independent variable (
€ 
δ  from equation 3), which represents the 
effect of losing merit-based aid by failing to meet the renewal requirement by a slight margin. Surprisingly, the 
regression discontinuity estimates are not consistent with the results from event history models. At the first two 
checkpoints, students who lost their scholarships tend to have a lower probability of stop-out and a higher 
probability of graduation. As I include more students by slightly increasing the bandwidth, these estimates 
become not statistically significant.42 However, the simple mean difference in the outcome variables between 
scholarship keepers and losers still indicates that scholarship losers tend to do better (fewer stop-outs and more 
graduates) than scholarship keepers when I limit my sample to students near the cut-off GPA. This counter-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The bandwidth used in Table 7 is 0.04. When I run the same model using a variety of bandwidths from 0.02 to 0.13, I find that the 
coefficient becomes not statistically significant although the sign of estimates is consistent. For stop-out outcome, estimates are 
statistically significant for smaller bandwidths from 0.02 to 0.06. For graduation outcome, estimates are statistically significant only 
when the bandwidth is 0.02 or 0.04.  
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intuitive result seems to reflect that there are many more scholarship keepers than losers within the bandwidth 
rather than the beneficial impact of losing merit-based aid. Among many students who met their renewal 
eligibility by a slightest margin, some of them might have earned their GPA through asking their professors for 
better grades or taking easier courses. If this were true, their GPA might not truly measure their academic 
ability.  
 
Table 7. Regression Discontinuity Estimates 
Checkpoint 1 2 3 4 5 
Drop-Out -0.637** 
(0.202) 
-0.228+ 
(0.128) 
-0.092 
(0.094) 
0.115 
(0.092) 
0.069 
(0.109) 
Graduation 0.374* (0.190) 0.226* 
(0.111) 
0.098 
(0.082) 
-0.134+ 
(0.073) 
0.078 
(0.079) 
Note: Estimates are the coefficients on the key independent variable that indicates whether students lost their scholarship at each 
checkpoint. Once students lost the scholarships, I exclude these students for analysis at subsequent checkpoints. Full results are 
available upon request.  
Note: p-value: +: <0.10, *: <0.05, **: <0.01, ***: <0.001, Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
To summarize, results from the regression discontinuity model shows that there is no significant 
consequences of losing merit-based aid on both persistence and graduation at least for students whose GPA is 
very close to the cut-off point. In other words, when students lose their scholarships by a slightest margin, it 
does not significantly harm their probability of re-enrolling and graduating from college. This result is 
somewhat contrary to the findings from event history models where I find that scholarship keepers persisted and 
graduated at a much higher rate than non-recipients, while scholarship losers did not. These contrasting results 
between the two models might suggest that the positive impact of keeping scholarships observed in the event 
history models occurred among highest-achieving students whose cumulative GPA was far right from the 
renewal threshold. It can be interpreted as either no real impact of receiving scholarships after the first year or 
heterogenous effects of receiving scholarships after the first year depending on students’ academic 
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performances (e.g., a large impact on highest-achieving students as opposed to a marginal impact on average 
students). 
 
Conclusion 
During the last two decades, more than a dozen states adopted merit-based aid. Merit-based aid is unique 
in that students must renew their scholarship eligibility periodically by maintaining their cumulative GPAs 
above a certain point. Due to this renewal requirement, a number of students lose their merit-based aid after a 
couple of years. This study examines whether losing merit-based aid affects student persistence and graduation. 
Using administrative data from Tennessee, I compare the probability of stop-out and graduation among 
scholarship keepers, losers, and non-recipients with event history models. I also employ the regression 
discontinuity method to minimize selection bias between scholarship keepers and losers by focusing on the two 
groups of students who received or lost their scholarships by a slight margin. I draw several conclusions based 
on my findings.    
First, receiving and maintaining merit-based aid is positively associated with persistence and graduation. 
Based on the results from event history analysis, scholarship keepers have higher probabilities of re-enrolling 
and earning a bachelor’s degree at almost every semester compared to non-recipients. This is consistent with 
previous studies (Henry, Rubenstein, & Bugler, 2004; Scott-Clayton, 2011) and encouraging in that the huge 
investment in merit-based aid actually has helped students succeed.  
However, it is not yet clear if this positive relationship is causal. As I focus on students who renewed or 
failed to renew scholarship eligibility by a slightest margin, the positive impact of renewing the scholarships 
becomes not statistically significant. Even more puzzling, students who lost their scholarships at the first two 
check points (at the end of the semesters in which they attempted 24 and 48 credits) by a slight margin had 
better college outcomes than students who barely kept their scholarships during the same period.     
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These contrasting results across different statistical models can be interpreted in two ways. First, these 
results indicate that the positive relationship between merit-based aid and college success is correlational rather 
than causal. Although I control for many covariates, some unobservable factors still remain and affect both 
merit-based aid eligibility and college success. If this were the case, merit-based aid might help students who 
are already doing well succeed in college by lightening their financial burden and rewarding their hard work. 
However, even in the absence of merit-based aid, these students would have succeeded anyway. This raises a 
question if providing these students with merit-based aid is efficient from the perspective of society (and states).  
Another way to interpret the contrasting results is that receiving merit-based aid at the time of college 
entry matters, but its impact is much smaller once students entered college. This view is similar to Hossler et al., 
(2009), who conclude that financial aid has a null or relatively small impact on college persistence than it has on 
initial enrollment. For example, students might find a way to finance their education by getting an on-campus 
job or having better knowledge about financial aid once they attend college. If this were the case, states might 
want to reconsider their merit-based aid design and change it into a form of front-loading.  
Second, losing scholarships has a slightly better effect on persistence and graduation than never 
receiving them. Based on the estimates from event history models, scholarship losers were less likely to stop out 
for the first two years and more likely to graduate after the fourth year. At other time periods, scholarship losers 
did not do better than non-recipients. These results seem plausible considering that students began to lose their 
scholarships after their second semester. For the first two years when many scholarship losers had received their 
aid, they persisted at a higher rate than non-recipients who did not receive the aid at the time. However, as a 
growing number of students lost their scholarships later, scholarship losers started stopping out of college and 
taking more time to graduate. Of course, this is one possible interpretation, and the mechanism needs to be 
further examined.        
This study contributes to the literature by examining college outcomes of students who once received 
merit-based aid, but lost it later. As merit-based aid in most states requires students to renew their scholarship 
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eligibility, a number of students lost their scholarships across states. However, few studies differentiate this 
group of students from initial recipients and explore their college outcomes. My study helps to fill the gap in the 
literature by investigating the effect of losing merit-based aid at different semesters on student persistence and 
graduation.  
In order to better understand the effect of losing scholarships on student success, there are some 
recommendations for future research. First, future research needs to examine whether the effect of losing merit-
based aid differs across different income groups. A student’s family income level not only affects her college 
outcomes but also influences the way she responds to financial aid. Given that low-income students are more 
responsive to price changes (e.g., Alon, 2011), losing merit-based aid might have different effects between low-
income and middle-income students. Due to data availability, this study could not take into account the effect of 
family income but Pell Grants eligibility. Future research with detailed family income information can explore 
the proportion of income groups within scholarship loser population as well as heterogeneous responses of 
scholarship losers based on family income.   
 Second, future research needs to explore how students who lose their merit-based aid finance their 
education after they lose it. Do they find a part-time job, borrow more money, or take a year off to afford their 
college education? Financial aid literature has long focused on the effects of receiving a specific financial aid 
program, but it has rarely examined how students cover their unmet needs. Exploring this question will help 
better understand the mechanism of the relationship between losing a scholarship and student success.         
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
My dissertation examines whether merit-based aid affects college affordability, student persistence, and 
degree attainment. Overall, my dissertation finds little evidence of unintended consequences of merit-based aid 
on college prices. However, neither does it provide strong evidence that merit-based aid has a causal impact on 
student persistence and graduation. I present several conclusions derived from my findings.   
In the first study of my dissertation, although estimates are widely varied across states, there is limited 
evidence that colleges raised student charges or reduced the amount of institutional aid in response to the 
creation of merit-based aid. Colleges in many states either decreased or maintained their student charges, in 
some cases, even with increases in the amount of institutional aid. These results call the Bennett hypothesis into 
question, which argues that colleges take advantage of increased federal student aid by raising their tuition. 
After all, colleges do not seem to take advantage of this newly created financial aid.          
Despite the encouraging findings, one question remains: why do colleges in different states respond 
differently to merit-based aid? In the dissertation, I explore if incentive from a merit-based aid program or each 
state’s higher education governance structure can explain the differences across states. However, these two 
factors just partially explain the results. In order to better understand the way colleges respond to merit-based 
aid, future research needs to consider the overall context of each state such as the availability of other state 
grants, state tuition policy, or demand for higher education.  
The second study of this dissertation shows that receiving merit-based aid does not change whether a 
student earns a bachelor’s degree or not. Instead, it reduces the time taken to obtain the degree. In other words, 
once enrolled in college, receiving merit-based aid does not make a big difference in terms of six-year 
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graduation. The null effect of merit-based aid on degree attainment is a bit surprising, especially given that 
recipients come from advantaged backgrounds at a higher rate than non-recipients.  
The null effect on degree attainment can be explained in two ways. First, as Hossler et al., (2009) 
conclude, financial aid may have a small or insignificant impact on persistence, in contrast to its significant and 
positive impact on enrollment. That is, once students enrolled in college, financial aid might not be a driving 
predictor of persistence and graduation. Second, it is possible that financial aid actually matters to persistence 
and degree attainment. However, the amount of financial aid received can be even out between merit-based aid 
recipients and non-recipients for two different reasons. Even if students were not eligible for merit-based aid, 
they could have received financial aid from other sources (e.g., federal aid, state need-based grants, or 
institutional aid). As a result, they might not have hard time financing their education and re-enrolled at the 
same rate as scholarship recipients did. Or, it is also possible that students who received their merit-based aid 
lost their scholarships after a couple of semesters. Without additional aid from other sources, initial recipients 
who lost their aid experienced the same financial hardship as students who never received it. My data allows me 
to examine this last possibility in the third study of my dissertation.  
In the third study of my dissertation, I find that losing scholarships is negatively associated with 
persistence and degree attainment. When comparing scholarship keepers, losers, and non-recipients, scholarship 
keepers had the highest probability of re-enrolling in college and earning a bachelor’s degree. Compared to 
scholarship keepers, both scholarship losers and non-recipients did not fare well in terms of the two outcomes. 
However, it is not clear if losing scholarships has as negative impact as never receiving it. These results indicate 
that the impact of merit-based aid is not large enough to affect degree attainment when students lost their aid a 
couple of semesters later.  
As a whole, my dissertation asks whether merit-based aid has some unintended and negative 
consequences on college affordability and student success. Despite its popularity among the public as well as in 
the research circle for the last two decades, a majority of previous studies focus on its effects at the college 
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entry level (e.g., college enrollment or access) without paying much attention to other areas (e.g., scholarship 
loss). Overall, this dissertation demonstrates that the availability of merit-based aid helps students who are 
eligible for the aid to pay their tuition without accompanying additional tuition increases or institutional aid 
decreases. However, it is not yet clear if this financial support from their states translates into their persistence 
and degree attainment. This conclusion is concerning considering that the ultimate goal of giving financial aid 
and making college education affordable is helping students go through the pipeline to earn their college degree. 
Facing the bad economy as well as other areas that need public subsidies (e.g., K-12 education, health care, 
etc.), many states may not be able to afford investing their money in higher education if their investment is not 
cost-effective. However, before making any major decision, it is necessary to explore other options as well as 
learn more about the effect of merit-based aid. In particular, I think that more work, both policy and research, 
needs to be done regarding the issue of losing merit-based aid in college.  
In terms of policy, I suggest that more emphasis should be on students’ effort in college rather than their 
academic preparation prior to college attendance. High standardized test scores and high school grades reflect 
the academic capability and effort of students in high school, which are expected to continue in college. 
However, once in college, many students face difficulties in navigating and making sense of their college 
system. Even though students know that they can pay their tuition with the state money as long as their 
cumulative GPA is above a 3.0, they might not know much about how to make that happen. If students were 
given more specific and timely guidance regarding how to do well in college, it could make a substantial 
difference in their persistence and graduation outcomes. This idea of combining counseling service with 
financial aid is currently studied, and its preliminary results seem promising (e.g., Patel, Richburg-Hayes, 
Campa, & Rudd, 2013).  
When it comes to research, more research needs to work on predictors and effects of losing merit-based 
aid. First of all, has the availability of merit-based aid attracted academically underprepared students to public 
four-year colleges and contributed their failure to renew their scholarship eligibility? Answering this question 
	   124	  
not only sheds light on the effect of merit-based aid but also contributes to the literature about mismatch 
between students and college (Bowen, Bok, & Loury, 2000; Sander & Taylor, 2012). Second, it is also 
important to know what happens to students once they lose their merit-based aid. How do these students finance 
their education, and does it affect their persistence or degree attainment? Does losing merit-based aid affect 
their social and psychological well-being in college, which might be related to their persistence and degree 
attainment? Pursuing these questions will bridge the gap between the two important areas of persistence 
research, each of which has been examined separately: financial and social aspects of student persistence (Nora, 
Barlow, & Crisp, 2006). Lastly, as a way to test the effect of losing merit-based aid on student persistence and 
degree attainment, it would be interesting to examine whether lowering the renewal GPA threshold affects 
student persistence and degree attainment. In Tennessee, since 2008, the renewal GPA requirement for the first 
two checkpoints has lowered from a 3.0 to a 2.75. If maintaining merit-based aid has a net and positive effect on 
degree attainment, this policy change would have increased the probability of earning a college degree among 
its recipients. In contrast, if receiving merit-based aid does not have a net effect, the policy change would not 
have made a substantial difference. Exploring these questions will shed light on a relatively unexplored area of 
financial aid research, the effect of losing financial aid, as well as provide more concrete evidence about 
whether and how merit-based aid works.      
 In addition, following my dissertation, I will continue to examine the effect of higher education policies 
on student access and success. Of many research ideas, I present four research plans below. The first two ideas 
are extended from my dissertation, while the latter two explore the issues in college access and success more 
broadly.    
Firstly, I will explore how colleges use their institutional aid, and its impact on student access and 
success. Institutional aid has long been used as a tool for enrollment management. Colleges use institutional aid 
not only to recruit a sufficient number of students but also to attract students with desirable attributes. I am 
interested in whether there is a change in the recipients of institutional aid as many states have adopted 
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statewide merit-based aid. With a large number of students eligible for merit-based aid, students will need a 
smaller amount of institutional aid. This will lead to a surplus of institutional aid unless colleges reduce the total 
amount of institutional aid offered. How do colleges distribute this surplus? What kind of students do receive 
the money? Answering these questions will have implications for college access as an increasing number of 
colleges seek students with solid academic records, who can also pay full tuition rather than students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds (Woo & Choy, 2011).   
Secondly, when examining the impact of merit-based aid on student success, I will consider its impact 
on student composition (college choice) in addition to its direct impact on student success. The adoption of 
statewide merit-based aid could affect the student body composition in in-state public four-year colleges. 
Depending on their admission policies and the eligibility requirement of merit-based aid, merit-based aid can 
attract either highest-achieving students (e.g., Castelman, 2013) or academically underprepared students who 
would have gone to community colleges without the aid (e.g., Binder, Ganderton, & Hutchens, 2002). Either 
way, the change in student body would have an impact on student success. In a future study that examines the 
effect of merit-based aid on graduation, I plan to use a model that reflects the change in student body. If the 
latter effect is larger than the former effect, we might need to reconsider the efficiency of the current design of 
merit-based aid, which gives monetary support for a large number of students with solid academic records.  
Thirdly, I plan to empirically test a key assumption of the human capital theory: students make a college 
decision after weighing the benefits and costs associated with college education. Although the theory has been 
universally grounded in financial aid research, critics point out that high school students are not as rational as 
they are assumed to be in the theory (DesJardins & Toutkoushian, 2005). In future research, I will first explore 
if high school students have accurate information regarding the benefits and costs associated with college 
education. Then, I will examine if the perceived benefits and costs are related to students’ college enrollment 
decisions such as attendance and choice. Results from this study will not only provide evidence to test the 
theory but also have an implication about college access for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Except 
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for a few previous studies, little is known about how high school students actually perceive college benefits and 
costs (Beattie, 2002; Dominitz & Manski, 1996; Kim, DesJardins, & McCall, 2009; Perna, 2008). 
Demonstrating perceived benefits and costs of students would help policy makers find which information they 
need to provide to students for their informed decisions.   
Lastly, more broadly, I am interested in the long-term process of how students decide to attend college. 
At this point, the three central predictors of college attendance are academic preparation, financial resources, 
and information about college education (or application process). Although my dissertation focuses on the role 
of the second factor, these three factors are closely related to each other. I would like to know how students 
develop these three factors over time, and if possible, which policy component can help students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds improve their outcomes on the three factors.  
College education may not be for everyone. Although college education has been a critical step to 
middle-class life, many people might find their happiness outside college. Hence, it might not be the best way to 
spend limited resources on ensuring that all students are college-ready. However, once students decide to go to 
college, they should be given an opportunity to attend college and succeed on their pathway to a degree. I hope 
my research can contribute to design, implement, and evaluate educational policies that help students’ journeys.   
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